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“Once established, religious intolerance tends to be self-sustaining . . . . So
every generation must nurture and pass on the commitment to religious
liberty. Grappling with the difficult and controversial issues of religious
liberty is part of that responsibility.”1
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The current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is entirely
severed from its historical moorings, and modern jurisprudence takes no
account of the reverence to which its authors attributed it.2 There exists
today only a disparate reflection of the traditional right of free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment. That reflection is largely devoid of
respect for individual liberty of conscience. Consequently, those who
would assert such rights, once inviolate, now must look elsewhere for what
should be constitutional protection.
The central infirmity of the Free Exercise Clause stems from a lack
of recognition of its historical purpose and pedigree. Its present scope is
largely confined to the protection of belief, but the Clause was never meant
to be so limited.3 The Founder’s Free Exercise Clause was a robust

2. Michael McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, First Freedom].
3. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 444 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2013) (stating that the owner of a commercial photography business is free to believe
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protection for religiously motivated conduct, as the text implies.4 “In the
Founding Era, religious beliefs, and their expression in a myriad of ways,
were assumed to be an integral part of individual and communal life.
Freedom — to object, to dissent, to express religious and conscientious
belief — clearly was accepted and protected.”5 For that generation, a
choice between the freedom to believe and the freedom to act was
essentially no choice at all.6
Unfortunately, the modern Free Exercise Clause doctrine favors a
progressive interpretation concerned more with efficiency and practicality
than meaningful protection of conscience. Individual liberty of conscience,
once present in the American legal understanding of free exercise,7 is no
longer a concern of the First Amendment. A truly panacean remedy
requires an introspective look into the foundations of the Free Exercise
Clause and a careful evaluation of the justifications for the jurisprudential
departure therefrom. To that end, this note seeks to reinforce the
importance and historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and
highlight the incongruities of the modern doctrine in comparison. Thus,
part I undertakes a review of the Free Exercise Clause as understood at the
time of the Founding. This review, though not exhaustive, is sufficient to
provide the proper lens through which to view the flaws of the modern Free
Exercise Clause and the foundations upon which new doctrine must be
built. Part II provides a critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence and its relatively recent evolution into the singular
form this note will refer to as the Smith doctrine.8
However, highlighting the theoretical flaws of doctrine is not
enough, nor does it provide an adequate understanding of the current state
of free conscience in free exercise law, and, accordingly, this note will
focus on illustrating its effects prominently on display in recent state and
federal litigation. Therefore, part III discusses the position of today’s free
exercise claimant and the stark inability of the Free Exercise Clause to
provide meaningful protection. Part IV seeks to provide a workable
alternative to the Smith doctrine that respects individual religious autonomy
what they will and make known any objection to same sex marriage but they may not refuse
to photograph a same sex marriage ceremony on this ground).
4. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 964
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 844.
8. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
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while recognizing practical necessity in our heterogeneous society. Part V
addresses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a separate but very much
related part of the broader free exercise landscape, as well as the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,9 which greatly affected
its interpretation. Finally, part VI strives to make a cogent argument for the
recognition of corporate free exercise rights under the First Amendment.
Overall, the principal goal of this note is to inject life into what is
now a stale free exercise debate and advocate for a meaningful
reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that respects its historical
significance in the First Amendment. This task is essential for the
continued protection of free conscience and religious liberty, for “[o]nce
established, religious intolerance tends to be self-sustaining . . . . So every
generation must nurture and pass on the commitment to religious liberty.
Grappling with the difficult and controversial issues of religious liberty is
part of that responsibility.”10
I. THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF FREE EXERCISE
In light of the often bitter debate surrounding the religion clauses of
the First Amendment, the relative clarity of the historical understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause can be surprising. The Founders held a principled
view of free exercise that is continually misunderstood in modern
jurisprudence.11 Such understanding can be cataloged in exhaustive detail,
and the subject has certainly received such treatment.12 Thus, a full
historical account of the foundations of the Free Exercise Clause and the
intellectual inspirations from which it came is not the purpose of this
section. Instead, the evaluation of the historical understanding of the
Clause and what it meant to those who authored the First Amendment is
intended as the lens through which the modern state of free exercise will be
viewed.
A. Free Exercise Meant Free Conscience
An inquiry into the connotations of religious liberty in the colonial
period yields a starkly different comprehension of free exercise and its
9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In the interest of
clarity, any use of the short hand Hobby Lobby in the text is a reference to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) unless
expressly indicated otherwise.
10. Laycock, supra note 1, at 451.
11. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546–47 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
12. For a thorough and complete analysis of the historical understanding and
background of the Free Exercise Clause, see Flores, 521 U.S. at 544–65 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Laycock, supra note 1; Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Origins]; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5.
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place in the First Amendment than the one that predominates in the law
today. Were this not the case, modern jurisprudence would have yielded
decisively divergent results.13
Instead, the current interpretation
characterizes free exercise as a sort of conditional benefit yielding
inevitably to the generally applicable law and providing protection only for
religious targeting.14 Essentially, this has relegated the Free Exercise
Clause to something akin to an equal protection analysis for religion with
little independent meaning, and this view is utterly inconsistent with the
historical understanding of religious liberty in early America.15 At the time
of the Founding, “when religious beliefs conflicted with civil law, religion
prevailed unless important state interests militated otherwise.”16 The latter
interpretation envisions a meaningful Free Exercise Clause able to maintain
its historic significance while the former deprives the Clause of its
constitutional importance.
While the First Amendment eventually contained the phrase “free
exercise” of religion, the fundamental liberty interest that necessitated the
Free Exercise Clause was freedom of conscience.17
The implicit
understanding was this right protected individuals in their private as well as
their public lives.18 The conception of free exercise as individual free
conscience is no small detail. Neither is the importance that this distinction
held in the mind of the Founders.19 “Of all of the ‘fundamental rights’
heralded during the Founding Era, calls for freedom of conscience were the
most insistent and the most intense.”20 The individual’s freedom of
conscience was equally vital to both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists
during the constitutional convention.21
James Madison wrote,
“[c]onscience [is] the most sacred of all property,” and “the exercise of
[conscience is] a natural and unalienable right” as it did not base its
legitimacy on positive law but on one’s duty to God.22 Thus, liberty of
conscience was not subject to state control simply because it was seen as a
natural right rather than a privilege granted by the state.23 In this way,
individual free conscience could not be abrogated by a lesser sovereign
authority without adequate justification.24 Such a view was shared by some
of the founding generation’s principal intellectual inspirations.25 Therefore,
13. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 845.
14. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
15. Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
16. Flores, 521 U.S. at 552 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
17. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 844.
18. Id. at 845.
19. Id. at 891.
20. Id.
21. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1600 (1989).
22. Id. at 1601.
23. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1497.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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“[o]ur Nation’s Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary
religious expression, not a secular society in which religious expression is
tolerated only when it does not conflict with a generally applicable law.”26
The drafting process of the Free Exercise Clause also provides
powerful evidence that the Founders advocated for the protection of
freedom of conscience.27 This issue was of great importance among the
states before ratification.28 The first drafts of the religious clauses were not
as succinct as they would ultimately become, and their development speaks
volumes about their purpose. James Madison was the main architect of
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,29 and he proposed their
first draft to the House in 1789.30 It read: “The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”31 The draft shows freedom of
conscience was closely associated with the Founder’s conception of free
exercise. In fact, the terms “rights of conscience” and “free exercise of
religion” were often used synonymously.32 The phrase “rights of
conscience” also appeared in the second draft as well as the final version
approved by the House.33 Similarly, the first draft of the religious clauses
in the Senate read: “Congress shall make no law establishing one Religious
Sect or Society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed.”34 Professor Michael McConnell has emphasized several
important aspects of Madison’s early draft including the use of the term
“rights of conscience” and its strictly protective language.35 The adoption
of the term “free exercise” itself is also vastly significant.36 It demonstrates
that Congress adopted the broadest possible version of the amendment by
including the word “exercise” because it protects action along with belief.37
Thus, the new language was no abandonment of the emphasis on
conscience but simply an adoption of the most inclusive phrase.
B. Liberty of Conscience Included Religious Conduct
It is vital to understand not only the founding generation’s
conception of free exercise but also the scope to which they attributed that
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 919–20.
Laycock, supra note 1, at 411.
Id. at 410.
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 920 n.380.
Id.
McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1482–83.
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 920 n.380.
Laycock, supra note 1, at 411–12.
McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1481–82.
Id. at 1490.
Id.
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right. Liberty of conscience was often described as, “free exercise of
[r]eligion according to the dictates of conscience.”38 Moreover, the
historical record demonstrates how free exercise was never limited to
worship or belief.39 “Religion was the expression of the beliefs dictated by
conscience; restrictions on religious exercise were restraints on the freedom
of conscience itself.”40
Early provisions of colonial charters, accordingly, protected most
religiously motivated decisions.41 Such provisions uniformly worked their
way into early state constitutions, and every state, save one, had adopted a
clause protecting free exercise by 1789.42 These early clauses were
extremely broad. Four states protected any act that was a result of religious
convictions.43 States’ free exercise clauses at this time were much more
detailed than the federal Free Exercise Clause would become, and many,
specifically, identified state interests weighty enough to constrain the right
of free exercise.44
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 is
representative:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to
worship GOD according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for
worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience . . .
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb
others, in their religious worship.45
“These state provisions . . . are perhaps the best evidence of the original
understanding of the Constitution’s protection of religious liberty.”46 Most
states referenced worship in their free exercise clauses, but there is no
record of any litigation over religious action not qualifying as worship. This
lack of litigation indicates the distinction changed little regarding the scope
of free exercise protection.47 At the time, the nation’s overwhelmingly
Protestant religious view would have necessitated such a broad definition of
free exercise because there would not have been a sharp distinction between
worship and daily life.48
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 891.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 553 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 919.
McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1427.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 552–53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1459.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 552–53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 553 (quoting N.H. CONST. art. 1, § 5).
Id. at 553.
McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1460–61.
Id. at 1460.
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Based on the 18th Century worldview, free exercise would have
necessarily included religiously motivated action. “Different degrees of
protection for religious belief and religious action would have been seen as
essentially meaningless, since the idea of belief without action was not seen
as a viable choice.”49 The Founders viewed the right of free exercise as a
protection of religious conduct the denial of which was presumptively
illegitimate, and only strong societal concerns such as public health or the
infringement of other private rights would have justified governmental
regulation.50 Such a view “make[s] sense only if the right to free exercise
was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden
only when necessary to secure important government purposes.”51 Although
the Founders held a broad array of denominational beliefs, “they were
virtually unanimous in the belief that the republic could not survive without
religion’s moral influence. Consequently, they did not envision a secular
society, but rather one receptive to voluntary religious expression.”52 There
is also little historical evidence that the Founders sought to maintain
neutrality between religion and non-religion.53 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote,
“[f]or the Americans the ideas of Christianity and liberty are so completely
mingled that it is almost impossible to get them to conceive of the one
without the other.”54 While this may seem at odds with today’s frenetic
calls for the abolition of the religious from public life, there is undeniable
evidence that the Founders saw religion as indispensable to good
government and that religion, in general, was something to be encouraged
and nurtured.55
Yet, the point emphasized here is not to pretend to make any new
religious argument that has not already been convincingly made. Instead, it
is to serve as a reminder, at the outset of the inquiry into modern doctrine,
of the foundations upon which the Free Exercise Clause was built and to
provide a lens through which to view the current state of the right. To be
sure, asking whether a modern claim would be protected under the
Founder’s conception of the Free Exercise Clause will not solve all of our
jurisprudential problems. However, if we are to attempt to remain true to
the foundations of our country’s “first freedom,”56 we at least must give
some thought to the answer.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 964.
Id. at 964–65.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 555 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 21, at 1595.
Id. at 1645.
McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1257.
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 21, at 1572.
McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1244.
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II. THE MODERN EVOLUTION OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward free exercise has seen drastic
ebbs and flows.57 In 1878, the Supreme Court held there could be no
excusal from the criminal prohibition of polygamy merely “because [the
offender] believed the law which he had broken ought never to have been
made.”58 Essentially the Court adhered, at that particular time, to a free
exercise distinction between religious belief and religiously motivated
conduct despite the historical evidence to the contrary.59 However, the
dividing line between religious belief and conduct would not last long after
the mid-twentieth century.60 The Court’s “decidedly unsympathetic”61 view
of free exercise shifted dramatically in 1963.62 Less than a decade later, in
1972,63 the constitutional protection of free exercise reached its zenith in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.64 Unfortunately, the doctrinal importance of
the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment was short lived, and the
free exercise landscape changed again, perhaps most dramatically of all, in
1990 when the Supreme Court handed down its controversial decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.65 Smith fashioned a veritable retraction of
free exercise jurisprudence, and it continues to be a rallying point for free
exercise reform.
A. Pre-Smith Precedent
In the recent history before Smith, the Supreme Court was
relatively protective of free exercise claims.66 One of the foremost
examples was the Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner involving the
claim of a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who was fired for
refusing to work on Saturday, “the Sabbath Day of her faith.”67 Her
dismissal on these grounds disqualified her from receiving unemployment
57. Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1709, 1713–
15 (2000). This Article largely focuses on the historical foundations of free exercise and the
departure of the Supreme Court’s free exercise doctrine from those foundations in the Smith
decision. Necessarily, early Supreme Court free exercise precedent is not examined here. For
an evaluation of such precedent from the time of the Founding, see Laycock, supra note 1
58. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
59. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism].
60. For a careful analysis of major precedent for both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, see John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1984).
61. Choper, supra note 57, at 1713.
62. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
64. Choper, supra note 57, at 1715.
65. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
66. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851 (2001).
67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
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benefits under state law.68 The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected her
free exercise claim, finding that she was not prevented from exercising or
observing her conscientious religious beliefs.69 For the first time, the
Supreme Court granted constitutional relief solely under the Free Exercise
Clause.70 In one of the opinion’s most important points, the Court noted
past cases upholding burdens on free exercise all involved conduct that
“invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or
order.”71 Here, the Court demonstrated a jurisprudential view of the Free
Exercise Clause that comported with a historical understanding of the
Clause.
Unsurprisingly, such language neatly tracks Madison’s
understanding of the permissible burdens of free exercise which recognized
the impossibility of protecting all religiously inspired conduct and
established that paramount state interests are required to justify such
burdens constitutionally.72
With the adoption of this Free Exercise Clause interpretation, the
Sherbert Court expressly required the finding of a compelling governmental
interest to justify a burden on a claimant’s free exercise rights.73 In such a
“highly sensitive” area of constitutional interpretation, the Court was
careful to remark “no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable interest would suffice[.]”74 Ultimately, no compelling interest
was found, and the denial forced the claimant “to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits[.]”75 The state’s
argument that the denial was valid because unemployment benefits were a
privilege, not a vested right, was dismissed out of hand: “It is too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed
by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”76
Accordingly, the Court found that the denial constrained the claimant to
abandon religious conviction in violation of her free exercise rights,77 and
Sherbert, thus, reaffirmed the constitutional importance of the Free
Exercise Clause and provided concrete protection reflective of that
importance.78
A decade later, that protection reached its high-water mark79 in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.80 Yoder held the Free Exercise Clause prevented the
68. Id. at 401.
69. Id.
70. Choper, supra note 57, at 1714.
71. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
72. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1464.
73. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
74. Id. at 406.
75. Id. at 404.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 410.
78. For a thorough evaluation of Sherbert and the creation of the substantial burden
requirement in free exercise law, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
79. Choper, supra note 57, at 1715.
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state of Wisconsin from requiring Amish children to attend formal high
school until the age of sixteen.81 Until 1990, Yoder remained the landmark
decision in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.82 Perhaps its most
significant contribution is the intensely fact-specific manner with which the
Court analyzed the free exercise claim.83 Unlike the position taken later in
Smith, the Court focused on the unique pressure the Wisconsin law placed
on Amish families and their religious autonomy.84 The Court surveyed
Amish traditions, beliefs, and the effects of compulsory secondary
education on their rural way of life.85
In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged
experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years
of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained
faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode of
life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s
requirement of compulsory formal education after the
eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs.86
The Court noted its goal of preserving religious liberty “[b]y preserving
doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic
application of the Religion Clauses . . . .”87 It warned that the dispensation
of such claims is a delicate task and found the claim did not come from a
“recently discovered” or “progressive” group but one supported by
centuries of history.88 By employing such a factual methodology, the Court
avoided the rigid application of overbroad standards and remained willing
to take into consideration the specific burdens placed upon individual free
exercise.
Yoder’s attention to detail is perhaps its best attribute; however, set
against modern free exercise law, its rationale concerning the applicability
of the law also remains salient. Here, the Court expressly rejected the
notion that “regulations of general applicability” placed the affected
conduct beyond the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.89 One of the
most important, and often overlooked, portions of the opinion states:

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 234.
Duncan, supra note 66, at 853.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216–19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 221.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
Id. at 220.
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Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that
Wisconsin’s requirement for school attendance to age 16
applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not,
on its face, discriminate against religions or a particular
religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular
concerns. A regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion.90
Importantly, the Court neither rejected Wisconsin’s interests in requiring
education nor questioned its power to enact compulsory education laws,91
and the law itself was not invalidated.92 It was the law’s specific
application to the Amish community which posed the constitutional
problem.93 Wisconsin was left on its own to work out “reasonable
standards” to protect the continued education of Amish children while
respecting their right of free exercise.94
B. The Current Free Exercise Standards
When the Court turned sharply away from the rationales of
Sherbert and Yoder with the Smith decision in 1990, our First Freedom
became our “most embattled.”95 Smith envisioned a move away from the
case specific analysis of Yoder toward a streamlined Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence. Instead of the Sherbert compelling interest test, the Smith
Court strove for the doctrinal clarity of broad standards. The Smith doctrine
certainly has this quality in spades; however, it lacks the attention to detail
and the seriousness of the previous free exercise inquiry, and this loss
vastly outweighs the benefit gained through its black letter clarity.
Nevertheless, the Smith decision is the foundation of the entire body of
current free exercise law.
1. The Smith doctrine
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment in Smith, but she
strongly disagreed with the new free exercise standard laid down by the
majority.96 She remarked, “[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws
of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 221.
92. Id. at 236.
93. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228–29.
94. Id. at 236.
95. McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1265.
96. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or
intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at
religion.”97 Alongside the Court’s pre-Smith precedent and the historical
understanding of free exercise, Justice O’Connor’s statement is steadfastly
consistent.98 Nonetheless, Smith’s basic tenant is that it is a “permissible”
reading of the Free Exercise Clause “to say that if prohibiting the exercise
of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect
of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended.”99
The unemployment compensation claim brought in Smith famously
involved the drug peyote, a plant-derived hallucinogen, used in traditional
ceremonies of the Native American Church in Oregon.100 When the
plaintiffs filed their claims, they were denied unemployment compensation
due to their ingestion of the Oregon schedule I drug, peyote. This drug use
constituted misconduct which nullified their unemployment eligibility.101
The Court’s summary of the legal relationship between the law and the
relevant conduct represents the simplistic way in which the Smith doctrine
can be applied to generally applicable laws: “Because respondents’
ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that
prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their
dismissal results from use of the drug.”102 Yoder’s goal of preserving
religious autonomy through doctrinal flexibility was abandoned.103 In fact,
it was cited only once in a string cite and in a completely new context.104
Smith does not deny the Free Exercise Clause protects actions as
well as beliefs,105 but it does withhold free exercise protection unless the
offending law is “specifically directed” at particular conduct in a nonneutral fashion.106 Therefore, strictly speaking, no law infringes upon one’s
right of free exercise unless that law was passed specifically to target
specific groups or conduct.107 This rather circular rationale is fatal to every
free exercise claim brought under a generally applicable law.108

97. Id. at 901.
98. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
99. Smith, 494 U.S at 878.
100. Id. at 874.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 890.
103. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
104. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
105. Id. at 877.
106. Id. at 878.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 890.
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a. The Flaws of Smith’s Free Exercise Interpretation
The Smith decision has been widely criticized for its monumental
shift in free exercise theory.109 Regardless of whether Smith is seen
favorably or unfavorably,110 it is not difficult to pin down the underlying
concern which prompted the decision. “[F]ear of religious pluralism is the
root of Justice Scalia’s much-maligned majority opinion in Smith.”111 The
language of the opinion indicates practical concerns about maintaining a
fact-specific free exercise standard.112
In Smith, the voice whispering in Justice Scalia’s ear
warned him that a strongly protective free exercise doctrine
would place at risk not only drug laws but also laws
dealing with compulsory military service, payment of
taxes, manslaughter, child neglect, compulsory vaccination,
traffic regulation, minimum wages, child labor, animal
cruelty, environmental protection, and racial equality. In
short, the social contract itself might not survive a
constitutional rule protecting religiously motivated conduct
from governmental restrictions.113
This was the exact concern of the Court in Reynolds, cited by Smith, which
stated the notion of permitting stringent free exercise protection would
“permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”114
There are two flaws with this assumption. First, Sherbert and
Yoder dealt successfully with the same concern nearly a century after
Reynolds.115 Furthermore, there is no evidence a flood of free exercise
claims bombarded the Supreme Court after the Sherbert decision in 1963.
Second, these concerns are unnecessary from the historical perspective of
free exercise. The above examples of rampant law-breaking would not be
permissible because these types of regulations are justified by the
compelling state interests of protecting private rights and public safety.116
In fact, it is reasonable to assume Smith’s new interpretation was
109. René Reyes, The Fading Free Exercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725,
730 (2011).
110. For a more complementary analysis of the Smith decision based on a conception of
the Free Exercise Clause largely as a protection of religious equality, see Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (2008).
111. Duncan, supra note 66, at 853 (footnote omitted).
112. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
113. Duncan, supra note 66, at 854.
114. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67
(1878)).
115. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
116. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 965.
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unnecessary to uphold the Oregon drug law since the Court could have
simply found the regulation justified by these same governmental interests.
Justice O’Connor expressly recognized this in her concurrence.117 Even
supporters of Smith’s general interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
have acknowledged this point: “The Smith opinion itself, however, cannot
be readily defended. The decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor
well-crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise
jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction. The opinion is
also a paradigmatic example of judicial overreaching.”118
Justice O’Connor found the majority’s “parade of horribles”
unconvincing.119 She pointed out such concerns have always been present,
yet, the compelling interest standard has proven itself workable.120
Professor McConnell addresses Smith’s practical concerns from a different
angle.121
Consider the fact that employment discrimination laws
could force the Roman Catholic Church to hire female
priests, if there are no free exercise exemptions from
generally applicable laws . . . . Or that churches with a
religious objection to unrepentant homosexuality will be
required to retain an openly gay individual as church
organist, parochial school teacher, or even a pastor. Or that
public school students will be forced to attend sex
education classes contrary to their faith. Or that religious
sermons on issues of political significance could lead to
revocation of tax exemptions. Or that Catholic doctors in
public hospitals could be fired if they refuse to perform
abortions. Or that Orthodox Jews could be required to
cease and desist from sexual segregation of their places of
worship. If the Court wishes to consider a parade of
horribles, it should parade the horribles on both sides. But
while the two parades may be of the same length, they are
of very different quality. The judicial system is able to
reject claims that would be horrible if granted; believers are
helpless to deal with infringements on religious freedom
that the courts refuse to remedy.122

117. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308, 308–09 (1991) (footnote omitted).
119. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 59, at 1141–42.
122. Id. at 1142–43 (footnote omitted).
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This string of examples exposes a fundamental problem with the Smith
doctrine. Smith sacrifices free exercise claims of good merit due to
concerns about the efficient application of constitutional law, and it places
the strictures of generally applicable laws upon a pedestal beyond the reach
of the Free Exercise Clause. Consequently, there has not been a single
grant of relief under Smith’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause since
1993.123
Oddly, Smith also attempts to rely on the political process for the
protection of free exercise rights, noting pointedly that several states have
implemented laws exempting sacramental peyote use from their respective
criminal drug laws.124 This reassurance misses the mark since it is
irrelevant to Free Exercise Clause interpretation how many states chose to
protect peyote use legislatively. “[T]he First Amendment was enacted
precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not
shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility.”125 The Free
Exercise Clause exists in the First Amendment specifically for this reason.
The Court recognized that relegating free exercise protection to legislatures
“will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in,” yet, it maintains this is an “unavoidable
consequence.”126 Justice Blackmun’s thoughts on this idea are prescient: “I
do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from
religious persecution a ‘luxury,’ but an essential element of liberty-and they
could not have thought religious intolerance ‘unavoidable,’ for they drafted
the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance.”127 As
Justice Blackmun eloquently stated, such resignation, concerning the loss of
free exercise protection, cannot be squared with the historical reverence for
the Free Exercise Clause nor the rest of our First Amendment
jurisprudence.128
123. Reyes, supra note 109, at 725.
124. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
125. Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 890 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. The reverence with which the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has
been treated in our constitutional history should reveal a stark contrast when compared with
the Smith doctrine’s result-oriented treatment of the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Brandeis’
famous précis of the Founder’s motivations for including the right of free speech in the First
Amendment is as excellent an example as any in our history.
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
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b. “Hybrid” Free Exercise Theory
The Smith Court outright stated “[w]e have never held that an
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”129
Given the facts of Yoder, this is a bit perplexing. Accordingly, the Court’s
explanation of this statement has been criticized as “strange and
unconvincing.”130 The Court explains its disregard of Yoder and Sherbert
in a very unique way by classifying those decisions as an entirely separate
category of First Amendment cases involving “the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections.”131
Under this
explanation, the exemption from mandatory high school attendance in
Yoder was justified only by the confluence of free exercise rights and the
parental substantive due process right to control the education of
children.132 Thus, the combination of free exercise rights, or any
constitutional right, with another fundamental right creates a “hybrid” claim
deserving greater protection because of the combined liberty interests.133
Since Smith presented no such combination, the free exercise claim did not
receive consideration because no exception may be made to the generally
applicable law.134 Under this explanation of past precedent, the Court
created a new framework with which to analyze claims of religious
liberty.135
Justice Souter openly criticized the hybrid rights theory and Smith’s
attempt to distinguish prior free exercise precedent in a later free exercise
case.136 He stated, “[t]hough Smith sought to distinguish the free-exercise
cases in which the Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general
application, I am not persuaded.”137 He believed Yoder left no doubt about
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). He continued,
“[b]elieving in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed
silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed.” Id. at 375–76. See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–42 (1943). Such eloquent sentiment should inspire pride and
respect for the entire First Amendment, including the Free Exercise Clause.
129. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
130. McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 59, at 1115.
131. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
132. Id. at 881 n.1.
133. Id. at 882.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
137. Id.
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its focus on the free exercise of religion.138 Such sentiment has been widely
shared in legal scholarship:139 “Yoder is like a moth that experienced
pupation for nearly two decades in a free exercise cocoon only to emerge in
Smith as a hybrid case involving both free exercise and parental rights.”140
Professor McConnell voiced a suspicion alleging, “the notion of ‘hybrid’
claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this
case.”141 Regardless, it is not an explanation that has enjoyed much support
by the federal judiciary.142
2. Lukumi
Smith has a companion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of
Hialeah.143 However, Smith dominates the structure to the point that
Lukumi supports no substantial weight of its own.144 Thus, Lukumi is part
of the existing framework, although it functions only secondarily.145 The
initial suit was brought to challenge a city ordinance passed in Hialeah,
Florida, which was, as discussed in depth by the Court,146 almost certainly
written for the specific purpose to prevent the religious sacrifice of animals
by a local Santeria church.147 This fact alone is the most important aspect
of the case, and it is why Lukumi is relegated to a secondary role in modern
free exercise jurisprudence.148 “The record in this case compels the
conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship
service was the object of the ordinances.”149 This conclusion changed the
fundamental rubric used to evaluate the constitutionality of the law.150
Thus, no compelling interest is required to uphold a neutral law; instead,
evidence of specific targeting of religious practice was sufficient to
mandate a more faithful application of strict scrutiny so that “many laws
will not meet the test.”151 “A law that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only
against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only

138. Id.
139. Reyes, supra note 109, at 730.
140. Duncan, supra note 66, at 857.
141. McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 59, at 1121.
142. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 442–43 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)
(discussing the treatment and criticism of the hybrid rights theory by federal courts).
143. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520.
144. See id. at 546.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 534–40.
147. Id. at 526–28.
148. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
149. Id. at 534.
150. Id. at 531–32.
151. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).

2015]

STRIKING A BALANCE

203

in rare cases. It follows from what we have already said that these
ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.”152
Lukumi establishes a small measure of meaningful free exercise
protection still exists in a very specific capacity, but this corner is tight
indeed.153 Only clear religious animus allows a claim to bypass the Smith
doctrine. Essentially, this requires ineptly drafted legislation or particularly
damaging legislative history.154 The claim in Lukumi involved both.155
Blatant evidence like this demonstrates how Lukumi was not a close case.156
The ordinance affected only the Santeria church, and the legislative history
demonstrated it was written specifically for that purpose.157 For this reason,
the decision serves only as a warning against religiously antagonistic laws,
but it is not a viable conduit for free exercise claims.158
3. Smith and Lukumi as Unitary Doctrine
It has been argued “that free exercise is alive and well in the wake
of Smith and (particularly) Lukumi.”159 As the theory stands, Smith is
merely the gatekeeper to the more stringent standards of Lukumi, and the
more meaningful protection available in cases of religious targeting is a
workable compromise between fears of religious pluralism and the
protection of religious liberty.160 That Smith serves a gatekeeping function
is an apt comparison theoretically,161 but this has not played out in
practice.162 If there was reason to be optimistic the Smith-Lukumi duo
would adequately protect free exercise in 1993, it is no longer warranted.
Indeed, the Smith decision has proven itself such a proficient gatekeeper
that no claim has gained access to Lukumi’s heightened standard at the
Supreme Court level since it was decided.163
By way of comparison, the respective conduct at issue in Smith and
Lukumi deserves attention as well. The protected practice in Lukumi is not
the prototypical free exercise conduct one might expect to find shelter in a
post-Smith universe. The Santeria church, long persecuted in Cuba,
conducted animal sacrifices at ceremonies for events like marriages, births,
152. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 534–42.
156. Incredibly, the president of the Hialeah city council was on record saying, “[w]hat
can we do to prevent the Church from opening?” Id. at 541. This sort of explicit legislative
history is not often present, making Lukumi largely inaccessible.
157. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
158. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
159. Duncan, supra note 66, at 851.
160. Id. at 881.
161. Id.
162. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
163. Reyes, supra note 109, at 725.
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and acceptance of new members.164 Smith, on the other hand, concerned
the ingestion of peyote during sacramental worship by Native Americans.165
It is worth noting the irony involved in the protection of the conduct in
Lukumi and the denial of protection for traditional Native American
practices in Smith. This demonstrates the incongruous application of the
Smith doctrine. At its core, Smith protects laws, not conduct. One of the
most damaging aspects of the Smith decision is that the conduct at issue is
not relevant to the outcome.166 Only the law is given scrutiny, not the
religious exercise, and this fosters a lack of respect for the right.
After Lukumi, Justice Scalia lamented that it turned the Smith
inquiry into one concerned only with the intent of the drafters of the law at
issue.167 He maintains this was not his position when writing the Smith
opinion which, instead, was to focus on the law’s effects.168 The point is
well taken, but an analysis of the intent of the drafters is now necessary
under Lukumi.169 This is another inherent flaw in the Smith doctrine.
Essentially, the analysis has evolved from a debate about the protection of
conduct versus belief,170 to a careful inspection of the individual burden on
free exercise,171 into an inquiry that disregards the religious conduct
entirely. The latter evolution has put tremendous distance between free
exercise and liberty of conscience.
III. THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODERN FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The current free exercise jurisprudence, completely severed from
the historical emphasis on free conscience, has resulted in a curious
consequence in modern free exercise law. “Smith appears to leave the Free
Exercise Clause without independent constitutional content and thus, for
practical purposes, largely meaningless.”172 The Smith doctrine has
essentially relegated the Free Exercise Clause to a position of such low
164. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525
(1993).
165. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
166. If there is any doubt that the general applicability standard has caused a certain
blindness in Free Exercise Clause interpretation by placing only the applicability of the law
under analysis and not the rights of conscience, one need only look to the failed attempts to
bring free exercise claims in state courts. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
309 P.3d 53, 73–75 (N.M. 2013) (deciding the free exercise claim of Elane Photography
after an evaluation of the application of the New Mexico Human Rights Act and concluding
that the law was neutral and of general applicability, and, thus, there could be no Free
Exercise Clause violation unless a hybrid claim was made), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014).
167. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558–59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 558.
169. Id. at 534–35 (majority opinion).
170. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
171. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
172. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 233 (1991).
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importance that any claim relying solely thereon is almost certain to fail.
This interpretation would surely seem strange to a founding generation that
attributed such importance to the careful protection of religious freedom.
A. The Position of the Current Free Exercise Claimant
In effect, the Smith doctrine is a grant of legislative immunity to the
generally applicable law, and it has relegated the Free Exercise Clause to a
truly dependent state. It is no exaggeration the First Amendment portion of
a given free exercise argument is likely the least significant aspect of any
claim. The Free Exercise Clause and the rights it once protected are quite
literally relegated to a footnote in Supreme Court jurisprudence.173 “[T]he
fact that the Free Exercise Clause has become so doctrinally otiose is itself
an argument for reinvesting the Clause with independent meaning.”174 If
this was not apparent after Smith, modern case law has surely made it so,
and there is no better example than the recent litigation out of New Mexico
in Elane Photography v. Willock.175 Elane Photography involves an
intermingling of state law with First Amendment principles, including free
speech and free exercise.176 Overall, the case is a comprehensive
demonstration of the present impotence of the Free Exercise Clause and the
insignificance of free exercise claims. The irony in Elane Photography and
similar cases is the lack of real consideration of free exercise of religion
despite the glaring implications for individual free conscience.
Elane Photography, owned in part by Elaine Huguenin,177 is
engaged in commercial photography in New Mexico.178 When it declined
to photograph a same-sex wedding ceremony, it found itself in the midst of
a lengthy discrimination suit under the New Mexico Human Rights Act
(“NMHRA”).179
Elane Photography’s claim the NMHRA
unconstitutionally burdened free exercise proved unsuccessful as the
judgment against it was upheld by the New Mexico Court of Appeals,180
and, in 2013, the New Mexico Supreme Court.181 Before the case reached
its final resolution, some commentators believed it should be resolved on
the grounds of a compelled speech argument alone.182 However, the free
173. See generally Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697 n.27 (2010) (dispensing of claimant’s free exercise
argument in a lone footnote).
174. Reyes, supra note 109, at 725.
175. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
176. Id. at 59.
177. Elaine Huguenin, who owns the company with her husband, spells her first name
differently than the first name of the company, Elane Photography.
178. Elane Photography, 284 P.3d at 432.
179. Id. at 432–33.
180. Id. at 438.
181. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 75 (N.M. 2013).
182. Brief for The Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 3–5,
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (arguing that Elane
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exercise facet of the case is unmistakable, and the pursuit of alternative
arguments shows the lack of confidence in such an argument.183
While Elane Photography initially advanced a myriad of claims in
support of its assertion the state statute interfered with its free exercise of
religion, the treatment of its First Amendment argument is a forceful
example of the insignificance of the Free Exercise Clause in modern
litigation.184 Before the New Mexico Supreme Court, the analysis of the
free exercise claim was dwarfed by that of the compelled speech issue.185
Most importantly, the Free Exercise Clause analysis centered, as it must
under Smith, on the statute itself, not the free exercise burden.186 Left with
no alternative, given Smith’s unyielding application, Elane Photography
was forced to devote much of its efforts to the applicability of the statute. It
focused on the law’s exemptions in an effort to show it was not generally
applicable and, thus, not subject to Smith’s standards.187 The court rejected
the argument that specific exemptions, such as home sales, prevented the
statute from being found generally applicable.188
The exemptions in the NMHRA are ordinary exemptions
for religious organizations and for certain limited
employment and real-estate transactions. The exemptions
do not prefer secular conduct over religious conduct or
evince any hostility toward religion. We hold that the
NMHRA is a neutral law of general applicability, and as
such it does not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.189
The hybrid right argument was also quickly dismissed on the grounds it was
not adequately briefed,190 likely because the lower court pointedly cited
Photography should be decided in favor of the claimant based on the theory that forcing the
company to take photos of same-sex weddings is controlled speech and so violates Elane
Photography’s right to choose what type of speech to create within the meaning of Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
183. Aside from the necessary interplay between these two fundamental protections of
the First Amendment, the compelled speech aspects of the case are not addressed here. For a
summary of the free speech aspects of Elane Photography, see generally Susan Nabet, Note,
For Sale, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515 (2012) (discussing Elane Photography in detail with
respect to the free speech arguments and implications).
184. Apart from its free speech arguments, Elane Photography asserted a violation of
the New Mexico Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, and the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Elane Photography, 284 P.3d
at 433.
185. The court devoted slightly more than four pages to the entire First Amendment
argument, including the hybrid rights portion. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 73–76.
186. Id. at 73–75.
187. Id. at 74.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 75.
190. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 75–76.
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widespread criticism of the theory.191 In the end, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals summed up the position of Elane Photography, and all free
exercise claimants in similar positions, quite succinctly: They “must accept
the reasonable regulations and restrictions imposed upon the conduct of
their commercial enterprise despite their personal religious beliefs . . . .192
The owners are free to express their religious beliefs and tell [plaintiff] or
anyone else what they think about same-sex relationships and same-sex
ceremonies,” but they simply may not refuse to photograph them.193
Regrettably, such sentiment no longer seems controversial in today’s free
exercise law.
The sort of analysis employed by the New Mexico state courts is
worryingly simplistic, but, generally speaking, this is not the fault of state
courts charged with the application of the federal interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause. The focus on the law and not the merit of the free exercise
claim is a natural consequence of the Smith doctrine. General applicability
now equals inviolability, and there is no room for individualized analysis.
Thus, today’s free exercise jurisprudence under Smith refuses to wrestle
with difficult questions of religious liberty because of the specter of
religious pluralism.194
B. Reliance on State Law
The unmistakable consequence of Smith’s “virtual abandonment”195
of the Free Exercise Clause forces claimants to rely on state law to
vindicate free exercise rights. This is an inherently odd position for a First
Amendment right to find itself, especially one so revered at the
Founding.196 It is also a position that necessarily yields drastically different
results, and, at least in this context, that is not a positive attribute. The
position of the modern free exercise claimant is wholly dependent upon the
nature of state protection of religious liberty.197 If that protection is
inadequate, and it often is, the sterility of the Free Exercise Clause becomes
ever more glaring.
State judiciaries have spent a considerable amount of time
balancing the Supreme Court’s rationale in Smith with countervailing
interests in state constitutions, and this is ongoing today just as in the wake

191. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 442–43 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
192. Id. at 443.
193. Id. at 444.
194. Duncan, supra note 66, at 853.
195. Smith, supra note 172, at 231.
196. McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 2, at 1244.
197. This is assuming that the claimant is unable to assert a claim under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. This statute, and its limited application, is discussed in detail in
section five.
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of the decision.198 At least eleven states have held that their respective state
constitutions mandate free exercise protection consistent with pre-Smith
jurisprudence.199 Relying on these provisions often yields positive results
for claimants and the most effective alternative to First Amendment
claims.200 However, this is not the case in a majority of states.
Furthermore, state constitutional claims face several structural obstacles.201
The relevant body of law is often undeveloped in state courts because of the
unfortunate (and overused) practice of interpreting state and federal
constitutional provisions identically.202 Thus, there is often no meaningful
198. This issue has continually remained relevant in state litigation. See generally State
v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Wis. 1996) (holding that the Wisconsin Constitution
mandated the continued use of strict scrutiny for free exercise claims despite the holding in
Smith); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 441 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)
(holding that federal standards should be used to interpret the state constitution’s religion
clauses because federal standards have been cited for state constitutional interpretation in the
past).
199. W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, Annotation, State Constitutional Protections, 2
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:51 (2013).
200. See generally Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 161 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2011) (stating that the Kansas Constitution provides greater protection to religious free
exercise than the First Amendment); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn.
1990) (recognizing that the more specific language of the Minnesota Constitution’s
protection of free conscience is more specific and is more protective of religious liberty than
the First Amendment); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ohio 2000) (stating that
there is no reason to interpret the religion clauses of the Ohio Constitution identically with
the First Amendment and holding that the Ohio Constitution’s free exercise protection is
broader and requires the continued use of the compelling interest test); Miller, 549 N.W.2d
at 239 (concluding that the Wisconsin Constitution is not “constrained” by the federal
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and that it provides an independent basis for free
exercise claims).
The only other alternative for claimants seeking state protection of free exercise is
to rely on reactionary state statutes aimed at the protection of religious rights. Fifteen states
have enacted a state version of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act in an attempt
to provide such protection. W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, Annotation, State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts (State RFRAs), 2 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW
§ 10:53 (2013). While the issue is still largely undecided, some state courts have held that
these statutes do not apply to suits between private parties. Id. Thus, such statutes do not
solve all free exercise problems even in the states that have enacted them. This was the
holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Elane Photography. Elane Photography, LLC
v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013).
201. For a detailed discussion of the interplay between state and federal constitutional
interpretation and the doctrines of lockstep and divergence, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE
LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
202. See generally S. Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant
Jesus Christ Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 715 (N.J. 1997) (limiting its free exercise
analysis to the federal standards because the court deemed that the current federal
jurisprudence made state constitutional interpretation unnecessary); Elane Photography, 284
P.3d at 441 (dismissing an argument for broader free exercise protection under the state
constitution and continuing to use federal standards); HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher
Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 642 (Tex. 2007) (assuming without deciding that
the Texas Constitution’s protection of free exercise is coextensive with the Free Exercise
Clause).
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state precedent on which to rely.203 In turn, this leads to a continuation of
this same trend as state courts remain in lockstep with the federal standard
even when it takes a drastic turn as it did in Smith. It is the job of the state’s
highest court to interpret the Constitution, and if that court has not done so
with respect to free exercise, it is not the fault of the claimant. Nor is it a
convincing argument for failing to address the issue when it is before the
court.
More fundamentally, state courts are often loath to interpret similar
state provisions differently from the federal counterpart.204 At times, state
supreme courts do not wade deeply enough into the state constitutional
interpretation, and some are seemingly uninterested in the question at all.
In one particularly troubling example, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
no reason to consider whether the New Jersey Constitution provides greater
protection to free exercise after citing the state equivalent of the
Establishment Clause.205 The preceding paragraph of Article I of the New
Jersey Constitution begins, “[n]o person shall be deprived of the
inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience,”206 yet the court neither cited this
provision nor discussed its relevance to the argument for greater state
protection of free exercise.207 Similarly, Elane Photography turned to the
New Mexico Constitution in hopes the court would find a greater degree of
protection for free exercise than the federal Constitution.208 The court
showed no inclination to open this line of inquiry and maintained the
continued use of “federal standards to analyze Elane Photography’s free
exercise of religion claim.”209 It indicated the New Mexico Constitution
prohibited only the forced support of certain denominations.210 Much like
the previous example, the quoted portion of the New Mexico Constitution
left out a portion of Article II, Section 11 which states “[e]very man shall
be free to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.”211
Whether this should be sufficient to confer greater protection under the

203. Elane Photography, 284 P.3d at 441 (pointing out that the claimant cannot offer
any state precedent to support its argument for greater free exercise protection under the
state constitution).
204. S. Jersey Catholic Sch., 696 A.2d at 715 (“[T]here is no need to consider whether
our State Constitution affords greater religious protection than that afforded by the First
Amendment.”).
205. Id.
206. N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 3.
207. S. Jersey Catholic Sch., 696 A.2d at 715.
208. Elane Photography, 284 P3d. at 440.
209. Id. at 441.
210. Id. at 441 (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11). Judge Wechsler strongly disagreed
with the court’s discussion of the New Mexico Constitution on this issue. See id., 284 P.3d at
445 (Wechsler, J., concurring).
211. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11.
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New Mexico Constitution, as the concurring opinion suggests,212 is
certainly debatable, but it surely is relevant to the discussion.
Ultimately, this sort of shiftless state constitutional interpretation
has serious consequences both for claimants and the development of
coherent state constitutional law. Litigants often fail to assert these claims
because of the begrudging reception and inattention these claims sometimes
receive.213 When asserted, they too often are only an afterthought. To be
sure, many state courts have dutifully considered these claims, and several
have found stringent protection in the state constitution’s religion
clauses.214 Nevertheless, apathetic state constitutional interpretation will
always exist leaving the protection of free exercise scattered. Such division
is reason enough to conclude that state constitutional protection cannot fill
Smith’s void.
IV. RESTORING INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE
Recent cases like Elane Photography denote a rather bleak view of
the importance of individual liberty of conscience and treat religious liberty
more as a practical impossibility than a historically venerable right. Given
the track record of free exercise claimants since Smith was decided in 1990,
it is not unreasonable to conclude the Free Exercise Clause has permanently
shed its historical significance in our modern jurisprudence.215 The
degradation of the Free Exercise Clause has been met with resignation and
treated as an unavoidable consequence in the orderly progression of society
as the fear of religious pluralism has infected nearly every aspect of free
exercise law.216 This trend must be reversed if there is to be a
reinvigoration of protection for free exercise and free conscience.
A. Returning to Pre-Smith Doctrine and the Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise
Religion is not intrinsically shielded from the burdens of neutral or
generally applicable law, no matter the definition bestowed on those
terms.217 The intolerable burdens of the Smith doctrine have proven even

212. Elane Photography, 284 P.3d at 445, (Wechsler, J., concurring).
213. HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 642
(Tex. 2007) (pointing out that the parties did not make a state constitutional argument on
their free exercise claim and that the court would assume the state and federal standards are
coextensive).
214. See cases cited supra note 200.
215. Reyes, supra note 109, at 725.
216. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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more threatening than the practical concerns it was invented to remedy.218
Fortunately, the restoration of the Free Exercise Clause does not require
revolutionary constitutional interpretation. It requires only a return to the
pre-Smith jurisprudence, the historical underpinnings of the Free Exercise
Clause, and its purpose in the First Amendment. Fundamentally, this
doctrine is simple. Madison characterized free exercise as an inherent right
presumptively protected so long as there is no interference with public
peace and security or private rights.219 This is a simple yet powerful free
exercise theory, workable in practice, and key to returning doctrinal
significance to the Free Exercise Clause.
Madison’s understanding, what may be called a historical approach
to free exercise,220 is more than mere theory, however. It has already held
an important place in the Supreme Court’s free exercise precedent. In
Sherbert, the Court noted that while free exercise cannot be immune from
all legislative restriction, “[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have
invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”221
Recognizing the need to balance necessity with the burden a regulatory
system places on religious exercise, the Court managed a workable standard
during this period that respected religious autonomy as much as possible,
yielding to regulatory schemes only when a paramount societal concern was
threatened, in other words, when there was a compelling governmental
interest.222 This standard is essentially Madison’s theory gilded in modern
terminology, and there is no reason to think it cannot provide a workable
Free Exercise Clause framework today, just as it did in the pre-Smith era.
1. Shifting the Burden to the Government
One of the most important aspects of the Sherbert compelling
interest test is that the government must justify the burden on the present
claimant.223 This focus alone will cause a dramatic departure from the
current inquiry.
The Smith doctrine’s application guarantees two
consequences in the presentment of every Free Exercise Clause claim.
First, it requires the claimant to show non-neutrality before the court will
even consider the burden on free exercise. The vast majority of a
claimant’s argument must be devoted to this issue, and it is usually outcome
determinative barring the application of Lukumi.224 Claimants seize on this
argument because it is the only realistic way to avoid the application of
218. This is because the framework put in place by Smith has essentially blocked all
free exercise claims not involving religious animus, thus restricting non-meritorious and
meritorious claims alike.
219. McConnell, Origins, supra note 12, at 1464.
220. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 965.
221. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 73–75 (N.M. 2013).
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Smith, but, practically, it ensures the government never has to justify its
regulation relative to its burden on religious exercise. The second
consequence is partly a product of the first. Because claimants must first
argue non-neutrality, the entire judicial inquiry is dominated by the law’s
applicability, and courts do not have occasion to consider the individualized
burden on free exercise.225
Both of these collateral consequences will be reversed with a readoption of the Sherbert compelling interest test. It will ensure that, once a
claimant has demonstrated an encumbrance on free exercise, the ultimate
burden will rest with the government to exhibit a compelling state interest
justifying its constitutionality.226 This is certainly nothing new in the
protection of important individual rights, but it drastically alters how the
modern free exercise claim will be adjudicated. The claimant will still bear
the responsibility of proving an actual burden on religious exercise, but this
will restore a vital element to this litigation because the religious burden
will be evaluated upfront by courts, ensuring that individualized attention
will be given to all claims.227 The main inquiry will shift toward the merit
of the claim and away from the law’s applicability. This will place the right
of free exercise back into its proper perspective. There will first be an
“assumption of freedom of conscience” that will be negated only where a
compelling governmental interest is found.228
These procedural
developments are vital to the resurrection of the Free Exercise Clause.
2. The Least Restrictive Means Requirement
The compelling interest portion of the Sherbert test is relatively
straightforward although the Court has enunciated it somewhat differently
over time.229 However, there is one aspect of the Sherbert era jurisprudence
that is not so settled. If the Court overrules Smith and reinstates the Sherbert
test, it would have to decide another question: Whether the pre-Smith
jurisprudence (and thus the new standard) includes a least restrictive means
requirement.230 While there is currently a divide among the Court on this
225. Id.
226. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
227. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–19 (1972).
228. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 967.
229. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990)
(“Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257 (1982) (“The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215
(“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
230. For an excellent examination of this question and the scholarly debate surrounding
it, see Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They
Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (1999).
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issue and evidence to support both arguments,231 there can be no doubt that
its inclusion would greatly benefit the protection of religious liberty.
In Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Smith, he remarked:
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a
consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality
of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion.
Such a statute may stand only if the law in general, and the
State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular,
are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served
by less restrictive means. Until today, I thought this was a
settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.232
Whether the least restrictive means requirement is indeed a settled portion
of the standard depends on an appraisal of some imprecise language. A
cursory reading of the Court’s pre-Smith precedent indicates the compelling
interest requirement is the entirety of the inquiry. Neither Sherbert nor
Yoder explicitly mentioned the least restrictive means requirement by name,
but they did employ very similar language.233 This requirement was not
used by name in United States v. Lee,234 and the Court also did not discuss
it in Smith during its analysis of the Sherbert test.235 However, the issue
requires a closer inspection, and there is reason to believe the least
restrictive means requirement did historically have a place in this
jurisprudence, albeit a rather subtle one.
The Court eventually used this exact language in the free exercise
context in Thomas v. Review Board, where it paired the compelling interest
test with the least restrictive means requirement.236 Long before this, the
Sherbert Court indicated it would be incumbent upon the party defending
the statute to show “that no alternative forms of regulation” would serve the
same purpose without burdening the right of free exercise.237 Similarly,
language in Yoder referenced a similar idea—”only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served” may prevail over free
exercise claims.238 As Professor Thomas Berg has aptly pointed out, the
Court later likened this language to the implementation of true strict

231. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2792–93 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
232. Smith, 494 U.S. at 907–08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
233. Berg, supra note 232, at 422–23.
234. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
235. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–89.
236. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
237. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
238. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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scrutiny review for free exercise claims, including the least restrictive
means requirement.239
If the Sherbert standard is reinstated, the Court will have to make a
determination on this issue. Recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the
Court had occasion to address this very question (in the context of
Religious Freedom Restoration Act), and it is clear there is a split of
opinion.
The Hobby Lobby majority maintained that pre-Smith
jurisprudence did not include the least restrictive means standard,240 while
the dissent vigorously argued the standard was used prior to Smith and the
Court’s statement to the contrary in Flores was incorrect.241 Because this
question is one of interpretation, this issue will likely lead to a strong debate
and be difficult to predict if the Court reconsiders its free exercise doctrine.
However, it is important to keep in mind the corollaries between the
compelling interest standard and the least restrictive means requirement.
“[T]he least restrictive means component is a logical entailment of the
compelling interest standard: if a less burdensome regulation will serve the
government’s interest, then the need to apply the more burdensome one is
not compelling.”242 Professor Burg’s analysis has strong logical force.
The least restrictive means prong was not applied to
exemption claims in a rigid or absolute fashion before
Smith.
Rather, this factor produced (as did the
Sherbert/Yoder test overall) a balancing approach, with
application of a general law qualifying as the least
restrictive means if—but only if—other courses of
regulation would significantly undermine the state’s ability
to protect its most important goals. This is a sensible,
moderate, yet religion-protective approach.243
If the Court were to readopt the Sherbert test, it would do well to explicitly
include the least restrictive means requirement in the new standards. This
framework has proven itself a strong protector of religious liberty in the
past as well as workable in application.244 If any new interpretation aims to
239. Berg, supra note 232, at 423 n.40. See generally Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals
Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1987) (discussing the application of strict scrutiny
to free exercise claims and using Sherbert, Thomas, and Yoder as support).
240. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 n.18 (2014).
241. Id. at 2792–93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Flores, the Court stated summarily
and without citation that RFRA “imposes in every case a least restrictive means
requirement—a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA
purported to codify—which also indicates that the legislation is broader than is appropriate if
the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
242. Berg, supra note 232, at 423.
243. Id. at 424 (footnote omitted).
244. Interestingly, Justice Alito recognized how the least restrictive means requirement
could impact the free exercise arena when he observed that if the standard had been applied
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recognize the historical significance of the Free Exercise Clause and liberty
of conscience, this “exceptionally demanding” standard could play a key
role.245
3. The Importance of Preserving Doctrinal Flexibility
The Yoder Court spoke of the need to preserve doctrinal flexibility
in order to achieve a rational application of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.246 Such flexibility is needed now more than ever, and the
Sherbert test is nothing if not fact intensive. Sherbert and Yoder represent
careful, individualized judicial inquiries, yet this framework was abandoned
in the name of judicial efficiency and practicality. While there is much to
be said for the practical consideration of judicial efficiency, it is not a
concept that may shape the interpretation of the First Amendment. Justice
O’Connor stated:
[t]o me, the sounder approach—the approach more
consistent with our role as judges to decide each case on its
individual merits—is to apply this test in each case to
determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs
before us is constitutionally significant and whether the
particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is
compelling . . . the First Amendment at least requires a
case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the
facts of each particular claim.247
There is reason to believe the Court is currently shifting back in
favor of such a philosophy in the broader realm of religious freedom, and
the least restrictive means requirement (discussed above) could play an
important role here as well. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy wrote a
careful concurring opinion in which he pointedly emphasized that the
government failed to satisfy the least restrictive means requirement
mandated by RFRA.248 While his remarks were tailored specifically to
RFRA’s application, he predicted the least restrictive means standard
“might well suffice to distinguish the instant cases from many others in
which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate.”249 This point

in a free exercise case like Lee, in which the statutory burden was upheld, the principle
reason would have been because there was simply no less restrictive means available for the
taxation requirement. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784.
245. Id. at 2780.
246. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
247. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
248. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 2787.
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was made after he emphasized the Court’s fact specific holding.250 In short,
he seems to indicate he views the least restrictive means standard as a
flexible device capable of distinguishing claims on a case-by-case basis.
This is quite similar to Professor Berg’s characterization of the standard as
a sensible device for the protection of religious liberty.251 Reading into
Justice Kennedy’s statements, there is reason to believe the least restrictive
means standard could again assume such a role.
B. Addressing the Specter of Religious Pluralism
“Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this
one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an
endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every
stripe.”252 A similar thought was certainly on Justice Scalia’s mind while
writing the opinion in Smith.253 However, the importance of free exercise
deserves, and the First Amendment requires, a greater commitment to the
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause and the protection of free conscience.
The Smith majority feared the continued application of the Sherbert
line of cases might allow each conscience to become a law unto itself.254
The problem is that this framework proved workable for some twenty-seven
years. It characterizes the extension of the compelling interest doctrine as
“courting anarchy” and lists a multitude of laws that would find themselves
suddenly in constitutional jeopardy.255 But the Court’s examples are largely
regulations easily justified by compelling governmental interests, and
Justice O’Connor has forcefully made this point: “The Court’s parade of
horribles not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest
test, it instead demonstrates just the opposite: that courts have been quite
capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing state interests.”256 Would
the government be able to demonstrate taxation is supported by a
compelling interest justifying the free exercise burden on those who believe
they should not have to pay them? The answer is obviously yes, and it has
already met this burden in the pre-Smith era.257
Somewhere along the line, the debate on this issue has shifted from
an emphasis on the importance of religious freedom to accusations of

250. Id. at 2785.
251. Berg, supra note 232, at 423.
252. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989).
253. Duncan, supra note 66, at 853–54.
254. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
255. Id. at 888–89.
256. Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
257. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (holding that religious belief
cannot serve as a basis for the nonpayment of taxes).
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requests for “preferential treatment.”258 This is a very strange perspective.
Seeking protection offered by free exercise of religion under the Free
Exercise Clause is no more seeking preferential treatment than is asserting
the right to freedom of expression under the Free Speech Clause. “Only
beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause which,
by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”259
Regardless of whether Smith’s fears of religious pluralism are justifiable in
the abstract, they are not justifiable in light of the Court’s existing
precedent,260 and they are no more so today. “If the Free Exercise Clause is
viewed as enacting a zero-sum game between democracy and religious
pluralism, we will all lose something of inestimable value.”261
V. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND HOBBY LOBBY
As vitally important as the doctrinal interpretation of the First
Amendment is, a thorough examination of the current state of free exercise
law also requires a look beyond the Free Exercise Clause itself. The Smith
decision caused significant changes in separate but related areas of the law
in addition to its jurisprudential shift. The most important collateral
consequence of Smith is the reaction it elicited from Congress in the form
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), enacted in November
of 1993.262 As the title implies, RFRA was a pointed, even bipartisan,
response to the Court’s decision in Smith three years earlier.263 It reinstated
the compelling interest requirement in an effort to override the Smith
doctrine and the general applicability exception.264
Congress ensured RFRA’s purpose was well understood by listing
five findings that supported the statute’s passage including the blunt
statement that Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion.”265 More importantly, the statute clearly states its
purpose—to reinstate the Sherbert test.266 However, it is vital to point out
258. “In seeking an exemption from Hastings’ across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS,
we repeat, seeks preferential, not equal, treatment; it therefore cannot moor its request for
accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.” Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of
Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697 n.27 (2010).
259. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981)
(emphasis added).
260. Marshall, supra note 118, at 308–09.
261. Duncan, supra note 66, at 855.
262. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
263. Reyes, supra note 109, at 730.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).
266. The relevant portion reads:
The purposes of this chapter are (1) to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in [Sherbert] and [Yoder] and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
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the text of the statute does more than merely revive the compelling interest
requirement.267 It reads: “Government may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”268 The inclusion of the least restrictive means requirement, the
significance of which was unclear with respect to pre-Smith law, has proven
vitally important in RFRA’s evolution.269
A. RFRA’s Constitutionality and Applicability
Facially, RFRA was the simple solution to the Smith doctrine that
Congress intended.
In application, however, it had significant
constitutional problems of its own that have severely limited its
effectiveness. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held RFRA, as applied
to the states, exceeded the enforcement powers of Congress under the
Fourteenth Amendment by attempting “a substantive change in
constitutional protections.”270 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
succinctly explained the rationale:
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress
does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not
the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the
“provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”271
The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is characterized as
“remedial” for this reason.272 An attempt to alter, rather than enforce,
constitutional protections through the Fourteenth Amendment runs afoul of
“vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance,” and RFRA, as applied to the states, was found guilty on this
count.273 After Flores, RFRA no longer provided an alternative cause of
action for free exercise claimants burdened by state law which drastically

(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
267. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).
269. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
270. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
271. Id. at 519 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
272. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
273. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
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reduced its scope.274, As a corollary, there is yet another important limitation
on RFRA’s application that has received only limited treatment in federal
court.275 RFRA’s language states “government” shall not substantially
burden religious exercise and appropriate relief may be obtained “against a
government.”276
Thus, questions abound with respect to RFRA’s
application to suits between private parties. When it was addressed, it
initially resulted in a miniature circuit split.277 Both the Sixth278 and
Seventh279 Circuits have expressly held that RFRA does not apply to such
suits by interpreting its statutory language to require government action.
The Ninth Circuit has also expressed doubts about RFRA’s application to
nongovernmental actors.280 Only the Second Circuit, in Hankins v. Lyght,
indicated it believes RFRA has application in suits between private
parties.281 However, this was in a very narrow context.282 The division is,
in reality, not much of a split as then Judge Sotomayor’s dissent in Hankins
is often cited to counter the majority’s reasoning.283 In fact, the Second
Circuit later criticized the decision itself.284 For all practical purposes, there
are at least four circuits currently limiting RFRA’s application to suits in
which the government is a party, increasing its handicap twofold.
These restrictions essentially foreclose all but one of RFRA’s
applications.285 RFRA originally was, and still is, applicable to the federal

274. For further discussion of Flores’ evaluation of the constitutionality of RFRA, see
Martin S. Sheffer, God Versus Caesar: Free Exercise, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, and Conscience, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 929 (1998); While she agreed with the
separation of powers analysis in Flores, Justice O’Connor took the opportunity to advocate
that the Court “correct the misinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause set forth in Smith”
so it “would then be in a position to review RFRA in light of a proper interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause.” Flores, 521 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Court of
course declined to do so citing the same concerns proffered in Smith. Id. at 534–35 (majority
opinion).
275. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
276. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
277. For one of the most recent summaries of this case law in federal court, see In re
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 485 B.R. 385, 388–92 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2013).
278. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 411–
12 (6th Cir. 2010).
279. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
280. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1999).
281. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
282. Id. (reasoning that since the statute at issue could have been enforced by a federal
agency, RFRA could serve as a defense to that action regardless of whether it applies to suits
between private parties more generally).
283. McGill, 617 F.3d at 411 (discussing the weight of the decision in Hankins and
Judge Sotomayor’s dissent in determining that RFRA does not apply to suits between private
parties); see also In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 496 B.R. 905, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
2013).
284. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 203 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).
285. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
n.1 (2006).
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government,286 and it is in this context that the statute has secured a
foothold.287 In 2006, RFRA displayed its vitality in federal litigation in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, which involved the use of a sacramental tea
regulated under the Controlled Substances Act.288 The case involved facts
strikingly similar to those in Smith, and RFRA’s application proved
dispositive.289 Even though the government could point to a compelling
interest for including the substance in the Controlled Substances Act, this
was not enough to satisfy the “focused” inquiry mandated by RFRA
because the specific harm at issue must be evaluated against the
governmental interests.290 O Centro Espirita proved RFRA could provide
formidable protection for free exercise when its applicability requirements
are met.
In practice, however, RFRA determines the outcome of only a
narrow set of cases today, and the free exercise claims arising out of state
regulation or private disputes are left to rely on state law as an alternative to
the Smith doctrine.291 Unless burdened by federal law, the typical free
exercise claimant is unaffected by RFRA, and its role, while noteworthy,
has not been of tremendous significance in free exercise law until recently.
B. RFRA and Corporate Free Exercise
There is one application of RFRA that merits special attention in
light of recent litigation, and, here, there is reason to be a bit more hopeful
about RFRA’s dexterity. This application involves RFRA’s protection of
corporate free exercise in the context of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).
The recent litigation involving the ACA and its controversial contraception
mandate is a dramatic example of the continually evolving exploration of
the strength and interpretation of RFRA by federal courts. After the
Supreme Court upheld the ACA in National Federation of Independent
286. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
287. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); O Centro
Espirita, 546 U.S. 418.
288. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 423.
289. See id. at 432.
290. Id.
291. It is true that most free exercise claims are unaffected by RFRA today and so are
still evaluated by the same standards that RFRA was enacted to change. However, there is
one particular area in which free exercise claims are not in the same position, though not
because of RFRA. Religious land use specifically has been altered greatly by another federal
statute aimed at protecting particular free exercise concerns relating to religious land use and
zoning laws. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) mandated
that the compelling interest test be used in relation to land use regulations that burdened free
exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. For a discussion of RLUIPA and its impact in relation to free
exercise claims, see Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional
Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929 (2001). See also Marci A. Hamilton,
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003).
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Business v. Sebelius,292 a massive body of litigation over the contraceptive
mandate became center stage.293 The law’s preventative care requirements
mandate effected health plans to include the full range of FDA approved
contraceptives, including intrauterine devices and “emergency
contraceptives” described as “abortifacients” because they cause the demise
of a fertilized embryo.294 Numerous lawsuits were filed challenging the
contraception mandate resulting in a divisive split among federal courts
destined for Supreme Court resolution.295 This split was eventually
resolved on June 30, 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,296 but the road
towards resolution was an interesting and eventful one.
1. RFRA’s Application at the District Court Level
At the outset of this now gigantic body of litigation, it was clear
corporations faced an exceedingly difficult task to prevail on their claims
that the contraceptive mandate constituted a substantial burden on their
exercise of religion under RFRA. The reception of these claims in federal
district courts was largely unsympathetic, and litigants faced significant
obstacles. The first major decision in this string of cases was Hobby Lobby
Stores v. Sebelius.297 Because the denial of Hobby Lobby’s injunction in
this case was, at first, upheld via interlocutory appeal by both the Tenth
Circuit298 and Supreme Court,299 it quickly became the standard citation in
subsequent opinions in district courts all over the country.300 Essentially,
the district court’s decision was a wellspring for the body of law that
reached the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, instructive to quickly examine
the Court’s treatment of Hobby Lobby’s RFRA claim.
The plaintiff corporations, Hobby Lobby and Mardel, operate 514
arts and crafts stores and 35 Christian bookstores, respectively, and both are
292. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
293. John K. DiMungo, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Coverage Mandate,
35 NO. 1 INS. LITIG. REP. 5 (2013).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
297. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
298. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
299. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct 641 (2012).
300. For an array of cases citing the Hobby Lobby district court in their decision to deny
temporary injunctions to the ACA, see Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (D.D.C.
2013) (citing Hobby Lobby for the proposition that corporations do not pray or worship);
Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115–16 (D. Colo. 2013) (citing Hobby Lobby in
its denial of the same injunction); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F.
Supp. 2d 394, 412–13 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Hobby Lobby to hold that corporations do not
enjoy free exercise rights); Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949–50
(S.D. Ind. 2012) (citing Hobby Lobby in deciding any burden on free exercise caused by the
ACA mandate was not substantial).
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owned and operated by the Green family in accordance with their religious
faith.301 Hobby Lobby and Mardel argued the mandatory provision of
abortifacients is a substantial burden on free exercise in violation of
RFRA302 among other things.303 Before this claim could be reached on the
merits, the litigants encountered what would become the foremost obstacle
in similar litigation throughout the federal court system—RFRA’s
application to the corporate form. Parsing statutory language, the district
court sidestepped the fact that federal law statutorily defines the term
“person” to include corporations and held the act inapplicable.304 The court
reasoned, “[g]eneral business corporations do not, separate and apart from
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees,
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take
other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention
and direction of their individual actors.”305 Bolstered by this conclusion,
the court declined to enjoin to the mandate’s enforcement.306
Members of the Green family also asserted RFRA claims on behalf
of themselves.307 Theoretically, their RFRA claims should stand a much
better chance of success than the claims of the corporations. However, the
corporate aspects of the Green’s claim invaded the analysis of their
individual argument under the substantial burden prong of the RFRA.308
The court employed an incredibly strict substantial burden requirement

301. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284–85 (W.D.
Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
302. Id. at 1285.
303. The Greens, of course, also argued that the mandate violated their rights under the
Free Exercise Clause itself but to no avail. Id. at 1285, 1287. The court announced that “the
rights of corporate persons and natural persons are not coextensive,” seizing upon a
distinction between constitutional rights available to corporations and “personal” rights
available only to individuals. Id. at 1287–88 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)). Since Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not religious
organizations, the court reasoned they could not have rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 1288.
304. Id. at 1291. See also 1 U.S.C. § 1.
305. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
306. Id. at 1296–97.
307. Id. at 1292.
308. Id. at 1293. To make a prima facie claim for a RFRA violation under Tenth Circuit
precedent, a claimant must prove (1) a substantial burden imposed by the government, (2) on
a sincere, (3) exercise of religion. Id. at 1292 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960
(10th Cir. 2001)); As previously discussed, this is one of the most troubling aspects of
forcing claimants to rely on a federal statute, or any statute, rather than the First
Amendment. Instead of the government bearing the burden of proving a compelling interest
to justify the regulation of free exercise, the claimant has the burden of proving the existence
of what was a constitutionally protected right in a statutory cause of action
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taken from existing Seventh Circuit precedent.309 Accordingly, a burden is
only substantial if it, “necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental
responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . impracticable.”310 Under
this stringent test, it is no wonder the court found it unlikely that a
substantial burden could be established because the relationship between
the ACA mandate and the burden on free exercise was too “indirect and
attenuated.”311
This litigation ultimately proved itself a perfect opportunity for
RFRA to once again become relevant in the protection of free exercise, but
the initial returns, represented by the district court opinion in Hobby Lobby
v. Sebelius, were certainly not encouraging. It was only at the Circuit Court
level that litigants enjoyed a more favorable interpretation of RFRA, and,
even then, such decisions were in the minority.312
2. RFRA’s Circuit Split
Treatment of RFRA’s application to for-profit corporations
continued as the main point of contention at the circuit level, and the
majority of courts found the statute inapplicable.313 While the Tenth Circuit
reversed the denial of the injunction in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius,314 the
district court’s reasoning resonated nonetheless in other circuits. After
quoting the Hobby Lobby district court’s statement regarding the inability
of corporations to pray and worship separate from their owners, the Third
Circuit in Conestoga Wood demonstrated its rather jejune rationale:
309. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
310. Id. (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752,
761 (7th Cir. 2003)). The current ACA litigation is not the only area in which such a
restrictive interpretation of the substantial burden inquiry has been employed. See, e.g.,
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006); Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d 752.
311. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See also Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109,
1117 (D. Colo. 2013) (finding that the ACA mandate does not prevent plaintiff from
personally exercising religion and that any burden on individual free exercise is “slight and
attenuated”).
312. See infra note 317.
313. Three of the five circuit courts to consider the issue either found that a for-profit
corporation could not exercise religion or did not qualify as a person under RFRA. See
Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). Two
circuits found RFRA applicable. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
314. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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[o]ur conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation
cannot assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause
necessitates the conclusion that a for-profit, secular
corporation cannot engage in the exercise of religion. Since
Conestoga cannot exercise religion, it cannot assert a
RFRA claim. We thus need not decide whether such a
corporation is a ‘person’ under the RFRA.315
While the analytical foundation for this conclusion varied slightly in other
circuits and employed more nuance, the fundamental premise remained
largely the same.316 The Hobby Lobby district court’s austere substantial
burden analysis received much less attention. This was largely a
consequence of procedure since this question was not reached in cases
where RFRA was found inapplicable.317 The three circuits that did reach
the substantial burden issue attributed much more weight to the stringent
standard required by the statute.318
Ironically, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, was the first circuit decision to
expressly hold that at least some corporations qualified as persons capable
of exercising religion under RFRA.319 In a sweeping reversal of the district
court, the Tenth Circuit found not only that the Dictionary Act’s320
inclusion of corporations in the meaning of “persons” was sufficient to
warrant RFRA’s application but, also, the right of free exercise is not so
purely personal as to make it unavailable at least to some corporate
forms.321 The court also pointedly questioned the foundational validity of
the alternative interpretation.322 While the Tenth Circuit decision was a
major reversal, three other circuits expressed views similar to that of the
315. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 385–88.
316. See Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1211–12 (stating that to determine whether a corporation
may qualify as a person under RFRA, the corporation’s capability to exercise religion must
first be addressed); Autocam, 730 F.3d at 625 (agreeing with Conestoga Wood that a
corporation cannot assert a claim under RFRA because a corporation is not a person as
defined in the statute and cannot exercise religion).
317. Autocam, 730 F.3d at 625–26 (forgoing the substantial burden analysis because
Autocam did not qualify as a person under RFRA); Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 388–89
(finding it unnecessary to address the substantial burden analysis since the corporation could
not assert a claim under RFRA and the owners could not assert their own free exercise rights
through their business).
318. Korte, 735 F.3d at 683; Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1218; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
319. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
320. The Dictionary Act, as its name implies, is a broad collection of definitions for
terms used in federal statutes. The Act itself states that its definitions should be used to
determine “the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1
U.S.C. § 1.
321. Id. at 1133–37.
322. Id. at 1137 n.12.
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Hobby Lobby district court,323 and the opinion received widely disparate
reactions from commentators in the interim between the decision and the
Supreme Court’s ruling in June.324
C. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby325 was a
consolidation of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius326 and Conestoga Wood.327 In
total, it involved the claims of three closely held corporations: Hobby
Lobby and Mardel, both owned by the Green family, and Conestoga Wood
Specialties, a Pennsylvanian wood-working company owned by the Hahn
family.328 Failure to comply with the contraception mandate would cost
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood an estimated $475 million,
$33 million, and $15 million respectively in annual fines under the ACA.329
Given the apathetic treatment of the corporate claims by a majority of the
circuit courts,330 the Supreme Court’s analysis of RFRA can be
characterized as surprising. Even more surprising to many was that Justice
Alito authored the majority opinion which many believed would belong to
Justice Kennedy, long thought to be the lone swing vote in the case, or to
Chief Justice Roberts.331 Nevertheless, Justice Alito’s opinion dealt
authoritatively with RFRA’s application and interpretation with respect to
corporate claims.

323. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
324. For a critical analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby, see Alan E.
Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 1, 8–12 (2014). For an alternative perspective, see Alan J. Meese & Nathan B.
Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit
Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014).
325. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
326. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
327. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
328. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.
329. Id. at 2775. The businesses are fined $100 per day for each qualifying individual if
they continue their practice of offering group health plans without covering the required
contraceptives. This amounts to $1.3 million per day for Hobby Lobby, $90,000 per day for
Mardel, and $40,000 per day for Conestoga Wood. Id.
330. See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d 377.
331. See Mark Walsh, A “view” from the Court: Justice Alito has his day in finale,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 30, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/a-view-fromthe-court-justice-alito-has-his-day-in-finale/; Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: One
Hearing, two dramas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2014, 4:50 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-recap-one-hearing-two-dramas/.
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1. RFRA’s Corporate Application
Finally answering the most divisive question of the contraceptive
mandate litigation, the Court found RFRA did in fact apply to for-profit,
closely held corporations.332 Recognizing such a significant limitation on
RFRA’s application would have “dramatic consequences,” thus, the
majority reasoned the forfeiture requirement of RFRA’s protection of
religious liberty to benefit from the corporate form was inconsistent with
the statute’s broad mandate.333
After discussing the inclusion of
corporations in the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person,” the Court
observed that nonprofit corporations had repeatedly (and successfully)
brought claims under RFRA.
The Court ultimately decided the
nonprofit/for-profit distinction was not the dividing line Congress
intended.334 “No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some
but not all corporations. The term ‘person’ sometimes encompasses
artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is
limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition of the term
includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit
corporations.”335 The Court also carefully pointed out its decision applied
only to closely held corporations as none of the businesses before the Court
were publicly traded; although, interestingly, the above rationale extends to
this distinction as well.336
Strict statutory interpretation aside, the principal argument that
RFRA could not encompass for-profit corporations was simply that such
entities are incapable of exercising religion.337 This was argued largely
because of the profit motive itself.338 Yet, the Court maintained that
general corporations may be created for any lawful purpose, including the
advancement of humanitarian and religious objectives.339 Since the
authenticity of religious belief was unchallenged,340 the Court rejected an
interpretation that would allow a nonprofit corporation to exercise religion
and prohibit RFRA application to those operating for-profit.341Essentially,

332. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
333. Id. at 2767.
334. Id. at 2768.
335. Id. at 2769.
336. Id. at 2774.
337. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
338. Id. at 2770 n.23.
339. Id. at 2770–71.
340. Id. at 2774.
341. The Court also dispelled of the argument that RFRA could not be read as
protecting the free exercise of corporations because it merely codified the pre-Smith
jurisprudence and was not intended to recognize new claims not already in existence. The
enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act amended RFRA in
an effort to distance it from First Amendment law after Flores. This amendment deleted the
reference to the First Amendment and independently defined the exercise of religion for
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the majority adopted a rational, common sense approach to an issue which
hamstrung multiple federal courts, and there is much to be said for this.
The ability of an entity to exercise religion is present or absent, important or
unimportant based solely on the existence of a profit motive. To be sure,
stating that any corporation has rights coterminous with individuals, or
indeed any rights at all, is a legal fiction.342
[Yet,] it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of
this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A
corporation is simply a form of organization used by
human beings to achieve desired ends . . . . When rights,
whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these
people.343
Such a point seems fundamental, but it took Supreme Court litigation to
gain recognition. Regardless, this characterization is drastically important.
To make this point clear, Justice Alito cited the now infamous passage from
the Hobby Lobby district court opinion declaring corporations unable to
separately hold religious beliefs, pray, or worship.344 Justice Alito’s
response forcefully cut through the hyperbole. “All of this is true—but
quite beside the point. Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at
all.”345
2. RFRA’s Substantive Interpretation
Having resolved the applicability issue, the Court was now free to
address RFRA’s standards and the merits of the claims before it. At this
point, the majority drew a clear line in the sand regarding the substantial
burden inquiry. “Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an
enormous sum of money . . . if they insist on providing insurance coverage
purposes of the statute, and this indicated that RFRA’s interpretation was not to be tied to
pre-Smith case law. Id. at 2772–74.
342. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
343. Id. (emphasis added).
344. Id.
345. Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291
(W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)); This point has generated quite a lot of debate
from commentators. For both perspectives see David Post, What’s wrong with the Hobby
Lobby decision, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/09/whats-wrongwith-the-hobby-lobby-decision/; and Llya Somin, Corporations and the “free exercise” of
religion – response to David Post, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 10, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/10/corporations-andthe-free-exercise-of-religion-response-to-david-post/.
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in accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a
substantial burden on those beliefs.”346 The Court clearly stated it would
not evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s claim that the forced
provision of abortifacients in company health plans was against their
religious beliefs. The Court stated the indirectness of the burden and the
reasonableness of the religious beliefs, an important issue at the lower
levels,347 was something federal courts had “no business addressing.”348
The Court’s consideration of the compelling interest standard was
rather short, and it assumed the provision of the contraceptives at issue was
a sufficient interest.349 The more consequential portion of the Court’s
analysis of RFRA’s standards was its focus on the last element: the least
restrictive means requirement.350 In some respects, this was another
surprise from Hobby Lobby because the government devoted most of its
efforts to the compelling interest standard.351 In fact, the least restrictive
means requirement of RFRA received very little treatment at the circuit
court level.352 Thus, by relying on this portion of the RFRA standard, the
Supreme Court’s analysis largely turned on an issue not fully addressed in
lower courts. Interestingly, once the focus of the Court shifted to the least
restrictive means standard, the government essentially fell on its own
sword.
The least restrictive means requirement is “exceptionally
demanding” and mandates the government show there is no other
alternative to achieving its goals other than imposing the current burden on
the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.353 The government simply could not do
346. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
347. See Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (D. Colo. 2013); Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014).
348. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–78.
349. Id. at 2779–80.
350. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(2) (2006).
351. Brief for Petitioners at 37–58, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (After thoroughly addressing the government’s argument about
RFRA’s application to corporations, Solicitor General Verrilli’s brief spent twenty pages on
the compelling interest portion of RFRA but only slightly over one page on the least
restrictive means portion.). See also infra note 357.
352. Most circuits did not address the least restrictive means portion of the RFRA
standard, and, even where it was addressed, its examination was often subservient to that of
the compelling interest requirement. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 685–87 (7th Cir.
2013) (evaluating the least restrictive means requirement together with the compelling
interest requirement and noting that the government “has not made any effort to explain how
the contraception mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering its stated goals . . . .”);
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (stating that the government
failed to address why an accommodation from the contraception mandate would frustrate its
goals and thus why there could not be a less restrictive means of achieving them).
353. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
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this with respect to the contraception mandate because it had already
created a built-in exemption for employers like churches and nonprofit
organizations openly religious in nature.354 Moreover, the ACA itself does
not apply to employers with fifty or less employees, resulting in the
exemption of thirty-four million people, and a tremendous number of health
insurance plans were grandfathered in under the ACA.355 From this
perspective, the government could not argue that imposing the
contraceptive mandate on this subset of employers was the least restrictive
means of achieving its goals,356 and this is very likely why the government
shunned this portion of the RFRA analysis throughout the litigation. In
fact, the government put forth no argument why it simply could not cover
these costs itself.357 Ultimately, “[Health and Human Services] itself has
demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive
than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their
religious beliefs,” and thus, “[t]he contraceptive mandate, as applied to
closely held corporations, violates RFRA.”358
3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is noteworthy on several
levels. It primarily underscores the narrowness of the majority opinion in
light of the mordant assertions of the dissent.359 The opinion is relatively
short, and there is no mistaking its purpose: to underline “that the Court’s
opinion does not have the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful
and powerful dissent,” and Justice Kennedy is certainly correct.360 Indeed,
the majority takes great care to explain this point.
Our decision should not be understood to hold that an
insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it
conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs. Other
coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be
supported by different interests (for example, the need to
combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve
different arguments about the least restrictive means of
providing them.361
Therefore, when Justice Kennedy reinforces this narrowness in his
concurrence, it is relatively clear he will not regularly find exemptions to
354. Id. at 2763.
355. Id. at 2763–64.
356. Id. at 2782.
357. Id. at 2780.
358. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782–85.
359. See id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
361. Id. at 2783 (majority opinion).
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governmental regulations through RFRA because there may be many other
cases “in which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate a
governmental program to countless religious claims based on an alleged
statutory right of free exercise.”362 This certainly is a sobering reminder to
those who might view Hobby Lobby as a fundamental revitalization of
RFRA that will continue to ripple through the free exercise landscape.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence displays how
important the existing ACA exemptions are to the outcome of the case. As
mentioned earlier, he was thought to be the lone swing vote in the case with
the other eight Justices evenly and solidly divided.363 His concurrence
certainly seems to prove this theory correct, but that is not the pertinent
point here. What truly matters is the future of RFRA’s interpretation in the
wake of Hobby Lobby, and this is why Justice Kennedy’s perspective is
uniquely significant. The other four members of the majority may well
have found a violation of RFRA without the existing exemptions under the
ACA.364 Justice Kennedy, however, made evident that the existence and
implementation of workable exemptions to the contraceptive mandate alone
prompted him to vote the way that he did. “But the Government has not
made the second showing required by RFRA . . . the record in these cases
shows that there is an existing, recognized, workable, and alreadyimplemented framework to provide coverage. That framework is one that
[Health and Human Services (“HHS”)] has itself devised . . . .”365 Justice
Kennedy also took issue with the fact it was an agency (HHS) making the
distinction rather than Congress itself, stating “RFRA is inconsistent with
the insistence of an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between
different religious believers—burdening one while accommodating the
other—when it may treat both equally by offering both of them the same
accommodation.”366 Together, these cautionary statements both publicly
recognize the dissent’s objections and provide a clear signal that future
RFRA applications, without such a convenient example of a workable
alternative, may not find the Court, and especially Justice Kennedy, so
receptive.367 This, together with his emphasis on the narrow, fact intensive

362. Id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
363. Denniston, supra note 335.
364. The majority seems to indicate that it was not entirely taken with the compelling
interest argument put forth by the government, and it is possible that at least the other four
members of the majority could have found against the government on this issue as well. See
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779–80. Yet, it seems very unlikely that Justice Kennedy would
have joined the opinion if this were the only ground on which a RFRA violation was
founded. See id. at 2785–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
365. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
366. Id.
367. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Reading Hobby Lobby in Context, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/linda-greenhousereading-hobby-lobby-in-context.html (discussing Justice Kennedy’s influence on future
applications of RFRA in light of his concurrence).
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nature of the opinion, necessitates a much more cautious prediction about
how the Court will interpret RFRA with respect to future claims.
Overall, there is no doubt that Hobby Lobby is an important
decision both for the protection of corporate conscience368 and, more
generally, for the betterment of modern free exercise. However, its benefit
for the free exercise claimant is limited by RFRA’s narrow application.
While the Court’s application of RFRA to for-profit, closely held
corporations was the headline of the Hobby Lobby decision, the revival of
the substantial burden analysis and the weight to which the Court ascribed
to the least restrictive means requirement may actually prove to be the most
important and long lasting effect of the decision. Practically, the Court’s
recognition of RFRA’s mandate and its strict interpretation of these
standards will likely have more widespread application than RFRA’s
inclusion of closely held corporations.369 This interpretation will find its
way into courts across the country in all manner of suits, not just those
involving corporations.370 Thus, Hobby Lobby will greatly affect even
individual RFRA claims against the federal government, and this is
possibly the decision’s greatest contribution to the protection of free
exercise. To be sure, RFRA’s application is still limited, but when it is
available, the Hobby Lobby’s interpretation will guide the analysis.
VI. LOOKING PAST HOBBY LOBBY TO THE PROTECTION OF CORPORATE
FREE EXERCISE UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Hobby Lobby corrected a flawed interpretation of RFRA’s
applicability and dramatically increased the importance of its least
restrictive means requirement. It also addressed some preconceived notions
regarding corporate ownership and religious exercise. What it did not do is
alter existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, nor should it have.
Hobby Lobby is a RFRA case, not a Free Exercise Clause case.371 As
Justice Alito might say, its effect on the Free Exercise Clause interpretation
368. The author hesitates to use this term. As shorthand, it effectively denotes the idea
of the corporate right of free exercise. However, as a purely descriptive term, it
mischaracterizes the essential interest protected by the recognition of corporate free exercise,
which is the protection of individual free conscience. Therefore, use of this term should not
be read to mean that the corporation in some strange way has a conscience of its own, but
that the corporation is entitled to free exercise rights for the sake of its owners.
369. See generally Douglas Laycock, Op-Ed., The Religious Freedom Act Worked the
Way It Should, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-and-the-supremecourts-hobby-lobby-decision/the-religious-freedom-act-worked-the-way-it-should.
370. The decision also may well affect the interpretation of state RFRAs by state courts.
While these are separate statutes, the interpretation of which are not dependent on the federal
model, the Court’s rationale will almost certainly seep into some state interpretations.
371. There was a Free Exercise claim raised by Conestoga Wood and its owners, the
Hahns, but the Court did not reach this claim. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
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is “precisely zero.”372 Nor did it alter any form of free exercise protection
for those burdened by state law since RFRA remains inapplicable to the
states.373 Hobby Lobby added a fresh dose of reason to a tangled web of
circuit precedent surrounding the ability of the closely held corporation to
exercise religion within the meaning of RFRA.374 Therefore, any
characterization of the decision as a fundamental alteration of modern free
exercise law is misplaced. The decision is a narrow one and highly fact
specific, as Justice Kennedy was careful to point out.375 The litigation itself
was the result of an unusual federal law with rather unique consequences.
Nevertheless, there are significant analogies to be made between RFRA’s
application to the corporate form and the argument for recognition of free
exercise rights for corporations under the First Amendment. Based on the
Court’s rationale, there is reason to believe this is the next logical step in
the present progression.
Two major arguments can be made on this front. First, given the
Court’s analysis concerning RFRA’s protection of the closely held
corporation, there is little logical distinction between this application and a
similar interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Second, such an
interpretation is consistent with other Supreme Court precedent regarding
the extension of First Amendment rights to the corporate form. This latter
issue has only recently been explored in federal litigation.376
A. Why is this Argument Even Necessary?
One might well ask why there is a need for the protection of
corporate free exercise rights under the First Amendment given the Court’s
decision in Hobby Lobby. At first glance it certainly may seem
unnecessary, but, practically, there are multiple reasons why the Court
should move in this direction. First and foremost, there is a vast
discrepancy in the protection of closely held corporations as the law
currently stands. Companies regulated by federal law who sue the federal
government will have the benefit of the Court’s reinvestment in RFRA’s
importance. Whether their various RFRA claims will prove successful is
372. Id. at 2760.
373. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
374. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
375. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
376. This issue was often a case of first impression at the circuit court level. See
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013). Its treatment differed greatly. Compare Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (“We see no reason the Supreme Court would
recognize constitutional protection for a corporation’s political expression but not its
religious expression.”), with Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d
1208, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“No such corpus juris exists to suggest a free-exercise right for
secular corporations. Thus, we read the ‘nature, history, and purpose’ of the Free Exercise
Clause as militating against the discernment of such a right.”).
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impossible to predict, but the salient point is that these companies will have
a solid basis on which to assert their claims. On the other hand, closely
held corporations regulated under state law that wish to assert similar
claims against state governments do not have the benefit of RFRA’s
protection.377 Hobby Lobby, therefore, has no direct impact on these
companies. To be sure, a fair number of states have their own version of
RFRA, and there is little doubt that the interpretation of these statutes will
be influenced by Hobby Lobby’s rationale.378 Nevertheless, most states do
not have such statutes, and this incongruent application will cause litigation
and possibly produce a divided body of law similar to the one that lead to
the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby.
The inclusion of corporate free exercise within the strictures of the
Free Exercise Clause will also provide greater certainty to the protection of
this right. Hobby Lobby may well have been a major victory for closely
held corporations that might assert religious claims simply because such
claims now have a foundation. However, it is far from certain that new
RFRA claims will enjoy any significant success once removed from the
specific facts of the ACA contraception mandate. There are strong reasons
to believe that the Court’s future RFRA decisions may not be as receptive
to challenges of federal law where alternative schemes are less obvious. In
Hobby Lobby, the Court explicitly relied on the numerous pre-existing
exceptions to the ACA mandate to prove a lesser restrictive statutory
scheme could eliminate the religious burden.379 Justice Kennedy’s position
is most precarious of all. He made a clear effort to credit the dissent and
point out that there will be cases “in which it is more difficult and
expensive to accommodate a governmental program to countless religious
claims,” and thus, his decision to join the majority was heavily fact
specific.380 In the future, viable alternatives often will not present
themselves so readily, and it may be much more difficult to garner a
majority of the Court. If this is the case, Hobby Lobby and its interpretation
of RFRA may provide significantly less protection than first thought,
leaving a need for the inclusion of these corporations in the Free Exercise
Clause.
Finally, with the prospect of litigation by closely held corporations
outside the current scope of RFRA protection, there is a tremendous
opportunity for a reinvigoration of free exercise debate across the country.
In the interim between Smith and the initiation of the contraceptive mandate
litigation, the significance of the Free Exercise Clause has been at an all
time low and the broader free exercise discussion had become stagnant. If
the issue of corporate free exercise was to reach the Supreme Court before
377. Recall, in Flores, the Court found RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
378. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
379. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
380. Id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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it has the opportunity to reconsider Smith, it would provide an additional
opportunity to reexamine the entire free exercise framework in the way that
the Hobby Lobby case provided an opportunity to reexamine RFRA. Even
if these claims flounder languorously in the lower federal courts, there will,
at a minimum, be a careful analysis of the Hobby Lobby rationale and its
application to the Free Exercise Clause, and this will be a positive
development for free exercise law.
B. Hobby Lobby’s Rationale and the Free Exercise Clause
Hobby Lobby did not address the application of its analysis to
existing Free Exercise Clause doctrine,381 and the Supreme Court has never
addressed this issue.382 Given the recent developments in the area of
corporate free speech, that is not so surprising.383 Statutory analysis
obviously entails vastly different interpretational considerations.384
Accordingly, one must be attentive in analogizing RFRA’s statutory
support of corporate religious exercise with constitutional free exercise.
That cautionary note aside, there are important parallels to be made. One of
the most fundamental precepts of the Hobby Lobby decision is that
corporate rights are created for the protection of the individuals associated
with the corporation.385 This is a practical minded view applicable both to
statutory and constitutional rights.386
One of the principal bases for the denial of RFRA’s application to
the corporate form at the circuit court level was the fact corporations are not
living beings and, therefore, cannot exercise religion in any tangible
sense.387 The logical force of this argument was found wanting in Hobby
Lobby, and it should fare no better in the First Amendment context.388 “[I]t
is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide

381. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
382. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012). See supra note
381.
383. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(holding that the right to participate in political speech cannot be denied on the basis of the
corporate structure).
384. Necessarily, statutory interpretation involves careful consideration of
congressional intent, legislative history, and individualized canons of interpretation. The
Court’s statutory analysis in Hobby Lobby was no different. Supporting statutes like the
Dictionary Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act played an
important role. The relevant comparison made here is not that there is direct precedential
value in the Hobby Lobby decision with regard to the Free Exercise Clause. It is simply a
logical extension of the underlying rationale with respect to the ability of a closely held
corporation to exercise religion that is being examined.
385. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
386. Id.
387. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385–88 (3d Cir. 2013).
388. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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protection for human beings.”389 Derisive remonstrations that corporations
have no soul and cannot believe or otherwise function on their own prove
little in debating the propriety of granting free exercise rights to closely
held corporations. While this sentiment infected the adjudication at lower
levels,390 the rationality of Justice Alito’s response is compelling: “All of
this is true—but quite beside the point.”391 A closely held corporation does
not need the protection of the free exercise clause for its building, its
charter, or it tax status. In fact, it does not need such protection at all. It is
the protection of the religious freedom of the owners that is deserving of
recognition whether or not they choose to operate their business in the
corporate form. This decision says nothing about the religious character of
any individual.392 Thus, there is no reason to grant religious protection to
the sole proprietor, yet, deny protection to the sole shareholder while the
two conduct the same activities.393
The for-profit, non-profit distinction similarly cannot justify the
denial of corporate free exercise rights. The argument put forth by some
courts is that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion because their
sole purpose is to make money, as if one necessarily excludes the other.394
“This flies in the face of modern corporate law.”395 Corporations can exist
for any lawful purpose including the promotion of philanthropic, charitable,
and humanitarian causes.396 Fundamentally, the religious nature of a
corporation, or indeed any business, cannot be judged by its outward
characteristics, and the protection of religious liberty should not be based
on such facile considerations. The free conscience of the individual is the
relevant liberty interest and the fact a given business operates for profit
does not alter this consideration.
Corporate law and the corporate form more generally is a device
created to promote the efficient use of capital and encourage market
participation. What justification exists then for requiring the choice
between the forfeiture of free exercise rights and the benefits of
incorporation? The Court has recognized that “[i]t is rudimentary that the
State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of
First Amendment rights.”397 The denial of free exercise protection simply
389. Id.
390. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
391. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
392. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
393. Id.
394. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 n.23.
395. Id. at 2770.
396. Id. at 2771.
397. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (quoting
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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because an individual or a group of individuals wish to conduct the affairs
of their corporation in a manner that is consistent with sincerely held
religious belief is such a forfeiture. Indeed, from an economic perspective,
the lack of respect for the religious autonomy of the closely held
corporation could be seen as a barrier to those with strong religious
convictions who might otherwise participate in the market utilizing the
corporate form and an advantage to those for whom this is not a factor.398
The Hobby Lobby majority recognized that such a business must, “either
give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo
the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations.”399
The argument for recognition of corporate religious autonomy under the
First Amendment is not a plea for preferential treatment or an elevation of
the corporation’s importance. It is a case for the recognition of the right to
free exercise of religion for the individual in all walks of life.
1. Authenticity of Belief
Corporations, like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, do not
choose to marry corporate decision-making and religious faith in a vacuum.
Very often there are serious financial consequences associated with such
decisions, and these decisions shape the image of the company in the court
of public opinion. Yet such decisions are made nevertheless, and this
points to sincerity and authenticity of religious belief. Authenticity is a key
issue because it removes any doubt concerning the motivation of a secular,
for-profit corporation conducting its affairs in alignment with religious
faith. The financial ramifications for the companies in Hobby Lobby were
dramatic as they faced tens of millions of dollars in fines per year under the
ACA if their litigation did not succeed.400 Businesses like Hobby Lobby
risk limiting their customer base, incurring significant costs in daily
operations, and amassing huge legal fees all because of religiously
motivated decisions.401 There is no reason to think its stance reflects
anything other than sincerely held religious beliefs.402 Interestingly, nearly
every court that has considered these claims, including those that rejected
them, explicitly noted the authenticity of a business’s religious belief was
398. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60 (1989).
399. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
400. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
401. See generally Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits Fights Coverage of Birth Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/health/religious-groups-and-employers-battlecontraception-mandate.html?pagewanted=all (stating that Hobby Lobby runs its stores
according to biblical principles, closes on Sundays, pays employees nearly double the
minimum wage, and provides comprehensive health coverage).
402. See Press Statement of David Green, THE BECKETT FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(Sept. 13, 2012), www.becketfund.org/davidgreenpressstatement/.
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unquestioned.403 If this is the case and the religious claims of corporate
ownership are genuine, then there is no basis on which to distinguish these
claims from those of the individual with no corporate association, and such
regulations should be subject to free exercise review just like any other.404
Is it worth denying protection for authentic claims simply because there
could be entities that attempt to take unfair advantage? Surely it is far
better to protect authentic belief and trust the judiciary to recognize the
insincere opportunist. Courts have already recognized this duty, and there
is no reason to think them incapable in this context.405
2. A Limitation on Scope
The Supreme Court limited its application of RFRA to the only
types of businesses before the Court in Hobby Lobby: closely held
corporations.406 Given the opportunity, there is good reason to believe it
can employ this same limitation with respect to the Free Exercise Clause.
This, of course, would lead to the exclusion of the publicly traded company,
but this delineation could prove highly useful. It may also be the only
possible framework.
However, this does not mean such an interpretation will be any less
effective. For one, there is likely little need for the inclusion of the publicly
traded company. By definition, these companies are owned by large
numbers of diverse individuals, and the actions of their officers and boards
of directors are carefully regulated by corporate law. Their duty is to the
best interest of the company, and it seems highly unlikely that this type of
corporation would wish to assert religious rights.407 The real need lies with
the closely held corporation in which there is often a small body of unified
ownership. By way of example, each of the three companies involved in
the Hobby Lobby litigation are owned and operated by members of a single
family.408 A free exercise limitation that recognizes this reality could help
garner a majority of the Court while still serving the interests of those most
likely to bring such claims. In this way, the distinction drawn in Hobby
Lobby could serve as a guidepost for a similarly limited holding in the
context of the Free Exercise Clause, if such issue came before the Court,
and such a limit would almost certainly increase the likelihood of success.
403. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d
Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
404. Lupu, supra note 254, at 978–80.
405. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 683.
406. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
407. Id.
408. Id.
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Ultimately, the Court’s rationale in Hobby Lobby provides a
powerful foundation for the recognition of corporate free exercise rights
under the First Amendment. When limited to closely held corporations,
there are numerous parallels between the analysis of corporate religious
exercise under RFRA and the protection of corporate free exercise under
the Free Exercise Clause. The businessman can act in accordance with
religious faith and free conscience while conducting the affairs of his
company just as surely as when he acts for himself, and the current
assumptions to the contrary stand in stark contrast to the historical
reverence of the right of free exercise. Hobby Lobby could well prove a
watershed in this area, beginning the transition to a new outlook on the Free
Exercise Clause, but there are still a great many briefs to be written before
that takes place.
C. The Court’s Protection of Corporate Free Speech and Its
Importance for Corporate Free Exercise
While the Supreme Court has never held that corporations are
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause,409 the application of
the First Amendment to the corporate form is certainly nothing new in its
precedent. For individuals, the protections of the First Amendment are
safeguarded by due process, and the Court has recognized that no
alternative source of protection is necessary when applying the First
Amendment to corporations.410 Moreover, “[i]t has been settled for almost
a century that corporations are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”411 There have also been major strides in this area
in recent years. In 2010, the Court decided a landmark case dealing with
political speech and the corporate form.412 As with Hobby Lobby, there are
significant parallels between the Court’s rationale and the argument for
recognition of corporate free exercise rights.
The strength of the comparison between corporate free speech and
corporate free exercise actually stems from two different cases. The first,
First National Bank v. Bellotti, was decided in 1978 and held
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute forbidding specified corporations
from spending money to influence the outcome of referenda.413 In so
holding, the Court stated the relevant inquiry was not whether corporate
rights were coextensive with the individual but whether the law at issue
regulated activities the First Amendment was designed to protect.414 In
distinguishing the right sought to be protected from the identity of the
409. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
410. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978).
411. Id. at 780 n.15.
412. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
413. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767.
414. Id. at 776.
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claimant, the Court found the corporate form did not alter the protection of
activities that would otherwise be sheltered by the First Amendment.415
Over thirty years later, the Court again had occasion to consider the
regulation of corporate political speech in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission.416 The federal statute at issue made it a felony for
corporations, including nonprofits, to advocate for the election of any
candidate within 30 days of primary elections or 60 days of general
elections.417 The Court struck down the law as an unconstitutional
restriction on political speech418 and expressly upheld Bellotti’s insistence
that the free speech rights of corporations should not be interpreted
differently simply because they are not natural persons.419 Together, these
two precedents provide a solid foundation upon which to base the extension
of free exercise to the corporate form.
The analogy between Citizens United’s protection of corporate
political speech and free exercise was made repeatedly at the circuit court
levels in the litigation leading up to the Hobby Lobby decision, often as an
issue of first impression.420 By and large, the argument did not have much
success. The Tenth Circuit offered some hopeful language, but none of the
circuit courts that considered the issue in ACA litigation expressly held that
the Citizens United rationale should be extended to the Free Exercise
Clause.421 In reality, this is not so surprising since these courts are relying,
as they should, on strict interpretations of existing precedent, but these
concerns are much less pronounced at the Supreme Court level.
The real concern is the underlying rationale employed by the
majority of circuit courts when discussing Bellotti, Citizens United, and the
application of the Free Exercise Clause to corporations. Interestingly,
several of the circuit courts place an unjustified amount of weight on oftquoted dicta contained in a Bellotti footnote discussing the notion of
“purely personal” rights not provided to corporations such as the privilege
against self-incrimination.422 Both the Third and D.C. Circuit expressly
415. Id. at 777–78.
416. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
417. Id. at 337.
418. Id. at 372.
419. Id. at 343.
420. See supra note 381.
421. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 682 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1212–14 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Autocam Corp. v.
Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y
of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 383–85 (3d Cir. 2013); Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
422. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Corporate
identity has been determinative in several decisions denying corporations certain
constitutional rights . . . but this is not because the States are free to define the rights of their
creatures without constitutional limit. Otherwise, corporations could be denied the protection
of all constitutional guarantees, including due process and the equal protection of the laws.
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relied on this footnote to make their determination about the extension of
the Free Exercise Clause to the corporate form. They formulated the
standard as whether the right is so purely personal that it cannot be
extended to corporations or whether the nature, history, and purpose of the
Clause renders it inapplicable to the corporate form.423 There are two major
flaws with reliance on such language. First, Citizens United, clearly and
explicitly reaffirmed Bellotti and its principle “that the Government lacks
the power to ban corporations from speaking.”424 The Citizens United
Court stated Bellotti’s central principle was that “the First Amendment does
not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate
identity.”425 Therefore, relying on a footnote for the proposition that
corporate free exercise rights do not exist under the First Amendment in an
opinion that expressly validates corporate rights of political speech is
perplexing.
Second, formulating the question presented as whether the history
and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause dictates it should be applied to
corporations clearly sets up the argument as a failure. While the
corporation is solidly engrained in American law, it certainly was unknown
when drafting the First Amendment, and asking whether the history of the
Clause supports its application to a modern legal device proves little.
Moreover, these courts have largely ignored the “purpose” portion of the
Bellotti footnote’s language and, instead, focused on the lack of precedent
on the issue which is obviously quite thin given the willingness of these
courts to place so much emphasis on a lone footnote.426
Ultimately, the circuit court treatment of the use of these two
precedents fails to give consideration to the central tenant of Bellotti,
reaffirmed in Citizens United, that the relevant conduct should be the heart
of the inquiry, not the identity of the claimant.427 The Citizens United Court
made clear restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are
impermissible because the First Amendment protects the act of political
speech, not a special category of speakers.428 If “political speech does not
lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a
corporation,’” what distinction exists to decide free exercise is of lesser

Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic
function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.
Whether or not a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations
for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision.”) (citations omitted).
423. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212; Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 383–84.
424. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347.
425. Id.
426. Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1213; Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 384.
427. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
428. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
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importance based on the same consideration?429 Our hard won First
Amendment rights are not dependent on such economic concerns.430 The
First Amendment Free Speech Clause protects speech, not the speaker, and
the Free Exercise Clause should be interpreted to protect the free exercise
of religion regardless of the believer’s identity. “There is simply no support
for the view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would
permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations,” and,
“[t]he Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or
forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and
media are entitled to less First Amendment protection.”431
Free speech, including political speech, was of such import both to
the Founders and the Court that concern for protection of the right was the
central concern, not the speaker.432 Similarly, it is the right of free exercise
that is the heart of the Free Exercise Clause, not the enumeration of certain
practitioners. The Founders likely did not foresee corporations as entities
capable of the exercise of religion just as they did not foresee them as
valuable sources of political speech, but that is not justification for a
reduction in the importance of the First Amendment. If this principle is
analyzed alongside the purpose and historical understanding of the Free
Exercise Clause, there is good reason to think the analogy between the
Court’s interpretation of corporate free speech and the argument for
corporate free exercise could yield fruitful results. Such a debate, though
perhaps of lesser significance than the long overdue reinterpretation of the
Court’s general free exercise jurisprudence, is nonetheless an important part
of the argument for a renewed emphasis on free conscience and the Free
Exercise Clause and one that may be seen as a natural extension of the
Court’s most recent decision in the area.
CONCLUSION
If there is to be a respect for the individual right of free exercise
and free conscience more broadly in American society, it must be first
resurrected in our modern legal doctrine. The inviolability of generally
applicable laws and the increasing disregard of religion’s importance in
society have caused a steep decline in free exercise protection. Individual
conscience today is sacrificed in the name of uniformity and practicality,
but these considerations cannot be made to trump the First Amendment.
Our Founders did not envision free exercise as an occasional privilege to be
balanced with pragmatic concerns. Current free exercise law subordinates
religious liberty to judicial efficiency, and the longer this trend goes
unchecked, the more difficult it will be to regain what we have lost. Our
429. Id. at 342 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784).
430. Id. at 349–50.
431. Id. at 353.
432. Id.
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excuse may well be that such a movement seemed laudable, progressive, or
even necessary. It may be that vigilant and jealous protection of free
exercise seems too burdensome. It may also be that when free conscience
is left to the grace of the sovereign,433 such excuses will seem trivial in
hindsight.
The historical underpinnings of the Free Exercise Clause and
individual liberty of conscience represent more than legal theory. The
reverence these rights enjoyed was a result of a more fundamental view of
the interplay between government and religion and their respective roles.
Professor McConnell surely reflects this idea better than anyone.
At its very core, the Free Exercise Clause, understood as
Madison understood it, reflected a theological position: that
God is sovereign. It also reflected a political theory: that
government is a subordinate association. The theological
and political positions are connected. To recognize the
sovereignty of God is to recognize a plurality of authorities
and to impress upon government the need for humility and
restraint. To deny that the government has an obligation to
defer, where possible, to the dictates of religious
conscience is to deny that there could be anything like
“God” that could have a superior claim on the allegiance of
the citizens—to assert that government is, in principle, the
ultimate authority. Those are propositions that few
Americans, today or in 1789, could accept.434
While many will disagree, as is their right, about whether this is the way
our society should continue to view free exercise today, there is no dispute
about the veracity of this characterization from a historical perspective.
Any other construction requires a willful decision to ignore the rich
religious history of our nation. Such a decision can be reached in the name
of modernity and progressivism, but that choice transfers ownership of
conscience to society and its government just as surely as it takes it away
from the individual, and there are still many people who would not make
such a bargain.

433. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 5, at 968.
434. McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 59, at 1152 (footnote omitted).

